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Abstract
Institutions play a pivotal role in the process of economic development. This
collection of studies addresses the importance of institutions in the process
of wealth creation for low-income households in Brazil, as well as commodity
market developments in Ethiopia. In Brazil, land institutions are shown to
have large impacts on poverty outcomes, when wealth levels are suﬃcient.
Infrastructure is found to go hand in hand with the establishment of strong in-
stitutions in Ethiopia. Decentralized infrastructure development in Ethiopia
is found to support eﬃciency between dependent markets in times of price
volatility. Additionally, in cases where infrastructure is insuﬃcient, advanced
institutional developments may be less eﬀective on market performance and
eﬃciency in developing countries.
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1 Land Institutions, Investments, and Income
Diversiﬁcation: Pathways to Economic
Development for Brazil's Quilombo
Communities
1.1 Introduction
Poor households in developing countries are exposed to greater risks of income
ﬂuctuations and take up more measures to insure against the detrimental ef-
fects of random shocks to their consumption. The most common ex post
mechanisms of mitigating the risk of drastic reductions in consumption in-
volve insurance schemes and inter-temporal consumption smoothing through
savings and credit transactions. However, households in developing countries
often rely upon informal insurance mechanisms of risk-pooling, which has not
been empirically found to be consistently eﬃcient(Bardhan and Udry, 1999).
Furthermore, credit markets are often imperfect in developing countries
and inaccessible to poor households. In the presence of incomplete credit
markets, households will resort to liquidation of assets to smooth their con-
sumption which can have deleterious eﬀects in the event that productive
assets are used, and the ability to re-accumulate necessary assets is limited
by investment disincentives (Carter and Barrett, 2006). Hence, when ex post
risk coping mechanisms fail, households will undertake an ex ante strategy
to reduce their risk of income ﬂuctuations, such as diversifying their sources
of income.
Typically, income diversiﬁcation has been attributed either to motiva-
tions of risk aversion or some cost saving strategic complementarity between
activities, respectively classiﬁed as push factors and pull factors (Bar-
rett, Reardon, and Webb, 2001). In either case, resource allocation decisions
about the optimal combination of variable inputs and ﬁxed assets will result
in a diverse income portfolio, but will be contingent upon the expectation
of realizing the full return to the application of the resources. In an agricul-
tural based economy, this introduces the role of land institutions and land
tenure security as a fundamental determinant for resource allocation, espe-
cially as it regards investments into ﬁxed and/or maturing assets involved in
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the production process.
The importance of functioning land institutions in economic development
can be further understood by examining the inherent connection between ac-
tivities, assets and subsequent income ﬂows. A household's capacity to raise
income through diversiﬁcation into high return activities (i.e. responding to
pull factors) is greatly inﬂuenced by its asset holdings (Barrett, Reardon,
and Webb, 2001). Income diversiﬁcation is also an attractive ex ante ap-
proach to mitigating unbearable variance in income, especially when ex post
mechanisms such as insurance or savings and credit fail to operate eﬃciently
(Bardhan and Udry, 1999). The eﬀectiveness of the ﬂow of resources chan-
neled by the asset-activities relationship can indicate the level of development
attained by a household, or even a country (Winters et al., 2009).
Activities which promote the manufacturing of value-added goods or the
provision of services typically coincide with forward moving developing pat-
terns and are typically better accommodated by the use of capital intensive
assets. For example, the set of assets required to engage in the manufac-
turing of value-added goods are quite distinct from those used in developing
countries for annual cropping activities. Income from manufacturing is of-
ten higher and more stable than streams from raw agricultural products
derived from annual crops. Closing gaps in accessing markets and engaging
in activities that penetrate niche markets or secure advanced positions of
the value-chain also require substantial capital investments in order to meet
quality-control requirements and volumetric expectations for large market
outlets that often provide better contract arrangements including higher re-
turns for producers (Markelova et al., 2009). Hence, the capacity to operate
in various productive activities will inherently engender a variety of income
outcomes for the household, which have direct implications for achieving
welfare gains and poverty reduction.
This study examines income diversiﬁcation as one of the mechanisms
through which secure land tenure operates to contribute to economic devel-
opment. I examine the way that land tenure security inﬂuences resource
allocation across a portfolio of income activities, and I consider the role of
increasingly diversiﬁed income streams on expected income levels. I frame
the linkage between land tenure security, resource allocation, and more di-
versiﬁed portfolio choices by considering income diversiﬁcation strategies re-
quiring investments into ﬁxed and/or maturing assets that are more likely to
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increase the stable earning capacity of households. The incentive to invest in
these ﬁxed assets is based on the land tenure security of each household, as
measured by the ability of their land holding status to protect against expro-
priation. Through this framework I address the following research questions:
How does income diversity aﬀect household income levels? Does secure land
tenure lead to a more diverse income portfolio? Do the resource allocation
incentives of secure land tenure lead to an income portfolio with an increased
amount of ﬁxed assets, reﬂecting increased investment demand? I approach
this problem by utilizing a data set which reﬂects the unique circumstances
of quilombola (quilombo inhabitants) households situated in the middle of
the implementation challenges associated with land reform policies in Brazil.
Many quilombola households are awaiting deﬁnitive titles to their land and
fall into several categories of land tenure based on their status in the Brazilian
government's land titling process.
This work makes two principal contributions and addresses the ambiguity
of the eﬀects of land tenure, providing insight into economic channels that
harness the beneﬁts of land titles. First, I identify the positive role of func-
tioning land institutions and land tenure security in enhancing the perfor-
mance of ex ante risk coping mechanisms. Previous studies have shown that
credit worthiness and better access to credit can be enhanced by strengthen-
ing property rights over land, which correspond to the ex post mechanisms
of risk mitigation. However, less attention has been given to the linkages
between land security and institutions, their resource allocation incentives
in ex ante mechanisms, and the beneﬁts of the subsequent income diversi-
ﬁcation strategies. Second, I provide evidence of investment demand being
stimulated by increased land tenure security and place the ﬁndings in the
context of the interrelated functions of assets, activities, and income.
Typically, studies of the land security eﬀects on investment demand deal
with the investment response in isolation, which abstracts from the identiﬁ-
cation of the beneﬁts of the investment. However, the current study enriches
the understanding of the incentives of land security by using a framework
that ﬁts into the ﬂow cycle between assets, activities, and income, which
provides clearer implications for household welfare and economic develop-
ment processes.
This chapter is structured as follows: section 1.2 provides the background
on land reform in Brazil; section 1.3 discusses the economic literature on the
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impact of land tenure; section 1.4 describes the conceptual model; section 1.5
discusses the data used in the analysis and the empirical strategy; section
1.6 summarizes the results of the analysis; and the chapter concludes with
section 1.7.
1.2 Land Reform in Brazil and Entitlement for
Quilombo Communities
The importance of functioning and secure institutions is a well-known con-
tributing factor towards sustainable economic development. Functioning
land institutions promote and provide protection for investments in produc-
tive assets and ensure that agents can receive the full beneﬁts of proper asset
management in their productive activities. The accumulation of productive
assets is essential to the economic security and empowerment of the poor,
especially in developing countries (Carter and Barrett, 2006). Failed insti-
tutions that do not provide security for assets remain as an obstacle to the
necessary investments required to transcend economic stagnation of the poor.
Such impediments leading to suboptimal investment levels are often the re-
sult of inaccessible credit and capital markets as well as general investment
disincentives due to high risk of asset loss in the absence of safety nets or
enforcement policies (Conning and Udry, 2005).
In the developing world, the consequences of failed institutions may be
most pronounced when considering informal property rights to land. For-
malizing the informal property rights held by the poor is a key step towards
correcting certain structural failures that imply greater problems of gover-
nance, particularly in Latin America. Land comprises the principle compo-
nent of the asset base of many households in developing countries, rendering
land tenure as a highly inﬂuential determinant in the composition of assets
included in a poor household's portfolio (Carter and Olinto, 2003). Reliable
mechanisms that enforce property rights over land and provide equal access
to resources and opportunities are essential elements for building a system of
governance which more eﬀectively facilitates economic development for the
poor (Deininger, 2003).
As the largest land mass in the Latin America, Brazil has been subject
to many disputes over land distribution. Stemming from its colonial past,
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inequality in the distribution of land has generally been a problem in Latin
America, Brazil being no exception. In 1985 the Gini coeﬃcient in land
concentration was reported as 0.854 (Alston et al., 2008). This indicates
that oﬃcial land holdings have been concentrated in the hands of very few
in Brazil. However, Brazil has recently implemented land reform initiatives
enacted by its Constitution of 1988 that allow for the compensated expro-
priation of unproductive land. There have also been colonization programs
initiated by the Brazilian government to populate unused public lands, es-
pecially in the Amazon region (Alston et al., 2000). This land redistribution
policy has provoked many conﬂicts throughout Brazil and thus spawned sev-
eral land movements. For example, the MST (Landless Workers Movement)
has organized a campaign that has drawn international attention (Alston
et al., 2008). Many of the conﬂicts arise due to the ambiguity in establishing
concrete property rights, while others arise due to disputes over whether or
not a parcel of land is being put to productive use.
Typically, these conﬂicts involve peasant farmers, or squatters, invading
a parcel of land that may appear to be unused or unoccupied. Both land
owners and squatters claim to be justiﬁed in their disputes. However, the
point of complication is establishing clear ownership of land. In order for
a land owner to oust invading squatters, he must prove that he has title to
the land. Because of costs associated with the legal process of reclaiming
invaded land, land owners often confront squatters and attempt to forcibly
remove them. Another reason for direct confrontation with squatters in lieu
of going to the courts is the trouble with proving that the land in question
was under productive use by the land owner. The land may consequently
be expropriated to squatters if it is determined that the land was not being
used (Alston et al., 2000).
1.2.1 Informal Claims to Land
This mode of land reform can be quite problematic for land owners with
informal claims to their land. In particular, the Afro-Brazilian communities
known as quilombos are engaged in many land disputes because of the lack
of formal land title. This is largely due to the history of the formation of the
quilombo communities. As explained by Silberling (2003), The quilombos
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are inhabited by descendants of Afro-Brazilian slaves who are either remnants
of communities of escaped slaves, or communities of former slaves, who stayed
on the land when it was abandoned by large landowners approximately 100
years ago. . .  In fact, some quilombos can trace their presence on the land
they occupy as far back as 400 years (Universidade de Brasília, 2004). In
an attempt to reconcile the land disputes over the legitimacy of land title
for the quilombos, the Brazilian government subtly included a clause in the
Constitution of 1988. It states, . . . survivors of quilombo communities occu-
pying their lands are recognized as deﬁnitive owners, and the State shall issue
them title to the land (Do Rosário Linhares, 2004). However, this clause
was inserted when the Brazilian government believed that the quilombolas,
or quilombo inhabitants, were small in number. In the year 2000, the Pal-
mares Cultural Foundation reported the existence of 743 communities, with
a population of 2 million, occupying 30.5 million hectares (Do Rosário Lin-
hares, 2004). By 2005, over 2,200 quilombo communities had been identiﬁed
(French, 2006). As of 2010, approximately 3,500 communities now identify
themselves as quilombos. In Brazil, state governments along with the fed-
eral land reform agency, INCRA (the National Institute for Colonization and
Agrarian Reform), are currently responsible for titling the quilombo lands.
These struggles for land title by the quilombo communities are not much
diﬀerent from the experiences of indigenous people across Latin America.
However, in the 1990s, some Latin American countries included special pro-
tections for indigenous lands into their constitutions. This is believed to
be a product of the International Labour Organization's (ILO) Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples Convention, No. 169 of 1989. This international eﬀort
to ﬁght for the land title of indigenous groups resulted in land provisions
and ownership rights over natural resources on territories occupied by in-
digenous groups throughout the Latin American countries that ratiﬁed the
convention (Plant and Hvalkof, 2001).1 In these regions, the rights of the
indigenous groups are secured and extended to any territories traditionally
occupied by these groups. This type of protection and respectful inclusion
would be ideal in the case of the quilombo communities in Brazil. However,
the international eﬀorts towards guaranteeing land title and property rights
are not as vehement for the quilombolas. The ILO's Convention No. 169
1At the time of publication, the ILO's Convention No. 169 had been ratiﬁed by Bolivia,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru.
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is primarily targeted at indigenous groups with very subtle implications for
the communal land tenure regimes for black populations throughout Latin
America.
1.2.2 Fulﬁlling Claims to Land
The diﬃculty in obtaining land titles for quilombolas lies in the bureaucracy
involved in the process itself. A quilombo community can present its petition
for entitlement either to the local state government, if there is an active
state agency administering legislation on land titles for quilombolas, or to the
federal government via the national land grant agency INCRA. Upon opening
a case for processing, the community must ﬁrst be certiﬁed and registered as a
quilombo by the Palmares Cultural Foundation, which is part of the national
Ministry of Culture. Thereafter, the community must have a technical report
of identiﬁcation and demarcation (RTID) completed and published to be fully
recognized by the Brazilian government as an authentic quilombo community
with valid territorial boundaries. The RTID must include an anthropological
report discussing the history of the community; a survey of the land within
the claimed territory to identify historical and contemporary boundaries; a
memorial description of the community; a registry of all of the quilombolas
families within the community; a survey of any conservation land, indigenous
land, marine areas, and any other public lands owned by the government
within the quilombolas territory; and valuation appraisal of the technical
and legal area considered for titling.
Publishing the RTID is quite resource intensive and must be executed
by government authorized experts including a professional anthropologist.
Quilombo communities play a small role in the development of the RTID,
which is essentially that of an informant. The cost of conducting the RTID,
which can take up to six months to complete by the most eﬃcient state agen-
cies, is born by the government. However, upon publishing the RTID, the
case must undergo various levels of review, including litigation in the civil
courts in case there is any contestation to the claim of some part of the terri-
tory by a third party living within the boundaries of the quilombo territory.
In such a case, if the presence of the third party is judged to be invasive,
there is an appraisal of the relevant land holdings and any improvements to
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the land made by the third party, and thereafter an indemnity payment is
made to the third party for any lost property.
However, as resource intensive as the entire process is, the government is
actually not utilizing all of the available funds allocated for titling quilombola
lands. In 2009, R$6.8 million of funds dedicated to the recognition, demarca-
tion, and entitlement process went unused and out of R$28.3 million available
for indemnity payments, only 6.52 percent of the funds were used (Instituto
de Estudos Socioeconômicos, 2010). Quilombo communities have a better
success rate of receiving land titles from state governments over the federal
government. Out of 24 titles distributed between 2008 and June 2010, the
federal agency INCRA only realized two, with the overwhelming majority
being granted by the local state government agencies. This disparity be-
tween state and federal government performance indicates that quilombolas
must rely mainly on their local legislation to eﬀect their processing. How-
ever, some states have a higher success rate and more interest in granting
land titles to quilombolas, rendering the outcomes largely dependent on the
location where the claim is being processed.
According to the Comissão Pró-Indio de São Paulo, there are currently
117 quilombola lands with title, encompassing 202 communities.2 Hence,
there is still a long way to go before the full property rights of the quilombo-
las are recognized throughout Brazil. The implications of this protracted
process of land rights distribution are underlined by the abject material
poverty prevalent throughout many quilombo communities. A recent sur-
vey of quilombo living conditions reported to direct the national Programa
Fome Zero (Zero Hunger Program) conducted by the Universidade de Brasília
(2004) reported that over 80 percent of their sample lived on less than US$1
per day. Furthermore, within the Fome Zero data sample, 63 percent of the
households indicate agricultural production as the primary source of income,
whereas only 32 percent of households earn income from some form of em-
ployment. Clearly, agriculture is a fundamental component of the way of life
in the quilombo community. Due to their isolation, which was historically
intentional, quilombos have often been connected to agricultural practices in
Africa that rely on basic farm tools in production (French, 2006). Quilombo-
las also consider their approach to conservation of resources and maintaining
2See www.cpisp.org.br/terras/asp/terras_tabela_print.asp.
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a balance in their traditional productive structure to make them socially dis-
tinct from other groups (Do Rosário Linhares, 2004). Hence, the importance
of secure land as the primary resource generating a livelihood for quilombo-
las, and their most promising pathway towards a better quality of life, cannot
be underestimated.
Moreover, time spent observing quilombo communities and interviewing
residents throughout Brazil's Atlantic forest region in 2010 brought a more
vivid understanding of the way quilombolas live in the context of land rights
claims. Many quilombolas are indeed engaged in agricultural production at
some level. Some people work as small-scale farm managers, while others
work as hired labor. In the community known as Ivaporunduva, found in
the banana producing region of São Paulo, a vertically integrated industry
based on organic banana cultivation is developing. Producers are supplying
organic produce to merchants as well as a processing facility located within
the community where value-added products such as banana chips are made
and packaged. In the Recôncavo region in the state of Bahia, a coopera-
tive of quilombola producers is marketing honey from its apiculture projects.
Therefore, despite poverty challenges there are quilombolas who are able to
mobilize their local economies. However, the most promising projects ob-
served throughout the various regions involved the use of some productive
asset that is ﬁxed to the land and require a medium to long-term time hori-
zon to realize the full beneﬁts of the operation. Furthermore, some of the
most economically vibrant communities were observed to either already have
land title or be further along in the process compared to some of their coun-
terparts where economic activity was quite limited to subsistence farming
operation and other small capacity income activities.
1.3 Review of Economic Impact of Land Tenure
Security
Consistent with limited success of the land title programs, there have been
limited studies speciﬁcally addressing the case of the quilombolas in their
land struggles and the subsequent economic implications. However, the
importance of deﬁnitive property rights in land has been well established
in economic studies of optimal resource allocation, especially in developing
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economies. Dependable and functional institutions are a vital component of
an economic system seeking to evolve into a transparent and eﬃcient mecha-
nism of exchange (Deininger, 2003). Feder and Feeny (1991) use a theoretical
model to describe the losses in economic eﬃciency due to uncertainty in land
tenure security and the adjoined disincentives to investment in resources that
bring about the greatest beneﬁt of the land for individuals, as well as soci-
ety. This result supports the general logic which suggests that with increasing
land tenure security, investment demand will also rise, and be met with a
more abundant credit supply due to the ability to use the land as collateral.
However, the intuition behind this logic faces some complex challenges in
practice. It is not necessarily given that investment demand across various
asset types will increase uniformly due to improved security of property rights
to land. Using panel data from Paraguay, Carter and Olinto (2003) ﬁnd that
household liquidity constraints may lead to diﬀerent investment decisions re-
garding the mix of ﬁxed and moveable assets due to changes in the status of
land tenure security. Constrained households are found to substitute move-
able assets for ﬁxed assets, while wealthier producers expand their complete
portfolio as well as shift its composition. Maintaining a diverse set of income
activities may not necessarily require the substitution of moveable assets for
ﬁxed assets even for poor households, once tenure security is acquired and
investment demand is stimulated.
Clear evidence of increased investment demand related to tenure secu-
rity enhancements has also been very sparse in studies of African economies.
There are very sensible theoretical reasons to expect a positive relationship
between land tenure security and investment. Strong property rights to land
are instrumental in ensuring claims to returns from investments; they in-
crease access to capital markets; they facilitate the liquidation and sale of
investments; land rights also provide the freedom to innovate or diversify the
uses of the land (Fenske, 2011). However, empirical ﬁndings have cast doubt
on the strength of the positive eﬀect of increased land tenure security on
investment demand. Endogeneity of the land tenure variable is problematic
in cases where land may transition from informal tenure and become titled
as a result of investments made to indicate ownership (Brasselle, Gaspart,
and Platteau, 2002). Studies of land tenure in West Africa have also found
that the duration of an investment makes an empirical diﬀerence concluding
that short-term investments such as labor, fertilizer, or insecticide use are
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less connected to land tenure security than long-term investments such as ir-
rigation systems, tree planting and leaving land fallow (Besley, 1995; Fenske,
2011).
Furthermore, although the expected beneﬁts of investments made in re-
sponse to increased land tenure security theoretically correspond to improve-
ments in agricultural productivity and higher incomes, empirical studies do
not always ﬁnd supportive evidence of this outcome (Place, 2009). This is
disconcerting, since the ultimate goal of eﬀectively implementing land re-
form is stimulating agricultural development and raising economic welfare
through investment and other mechanisms. However, Smith (2004) ﬁnds ev-
idence that land tenure security in the form of land title positively contributes
to ﬁxed investments and that households with secure land holdings obtain
the greatest portion of their income from high return activities that make
use of ﬁxed investments. Such cases of coupling assets with certain types of
activities can serve as a meaningful catalyst for reducing household poverty
levels and securing income streams, especially when ﬁxed assets prove to
be adequately fungible (Winters et al., 2009). Hence, the complementar-
ity between assets, activities, and income creates a means of channeling the
determinants of household decisions about livelihood strategies and enriches
the understanding of how the feasible set of options can be improved, leading
to increased welfare.
1.4 Conceptual Model
The conceptual model of income diversiﬁcation is adapted from the standard
model of inter-temporal household consumption in the presence of uncertain
income in future periods as presented in Bardhan and Udry (1999) and in-
corporates a model of investment similar to Fenske (2011) where resource
allocation decisions are made over two periods. First, consider the utility
function of the typical household,
Ut = Et
T∑
τ=t
βτ−tu (ct) (1.1)
where u (·) is continuously twice diﬀerentiable, with u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0. Ut
is the expected utility of a households over the remainder of its lifetime and
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ct is the consumption level in period t. The household can borrow or lend
on a credit market at a certain interest rate rt. At the start of the period
t, the household's asset stock is At, which is positive if the household is a
lender and negative if the household is borrower. The household receives a
random income yt and must allocate its resources between consumption and
net savings for the next period such that:
At+1 = (1 + rt) (At + yt − ct) . (1.2)
The household maximizes its expected utility subject to equation 1.2, non-
negativity constraints on consumption, the transversality condition AT+1 ≥
0, and a liquidity constraint of the form:
At + yt − ct ≥ 0. (1.3)
In equilibrium, the transversality condition will bind such that the household
can be a debtor in any period except the ﬁnal period, implying that AT+1 = 0.
Suppose producers are faced with a portfolio decision that involves the
determination of how to diversify their income activities. Let income in
period t be determined by the previous period portfolio choice xt−1 where
yt = y (xt−1). A producer seeking to maximize his returns has an endow-
ment of land and liquid capital to purchase variable inputs and ﬁxed assets.
Labor can be hired either through the household, external labor markets,
or both. For each period t, there exists a feasible set of N portfolio choices
Xt = {x1t, . . . , xNt} such that for a portfolio choice i, xit = xt (qi, ki)where
qi and ki are the vectors variable inputs and ﬁxed assets, respectively, which
correspond to the resource allocation made for the portfolio choice. The
technology of the producer is such that for every resource allocation corre-
sponding to a portfolio choice, there exists a feasible set of M production
functions such that xt (qi, ki) −→ G (qi, ki) : {g1 (qi1,ki1) , . . . , gM (qiM , kiM)}.
For any production activity j, the corresponding production function gj is
increasing and concave in both of its arguments.
During the ﬁrst period, the producer chooses some level of ﬁxed invest-
ment ki, with a positive and convex cost ht−1 (ki), to be allocated across pro-
ductive activity j, constituting the portfolio choice that utilizes the ﬁxed as-
set. The output of the production activity is realized after the second period.
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However, after the ﬁrst period the producer faces uncertainty about whether
he will retain his land, which is denoted by the probability S (l, ki) ∈ (0, 1).
If the producer loses the land, he will not realize the return to his investment
in the ﬁrst period. S is considered to be security of the land holding, which
is endogenous to the strength of land tenure l as is determined by the status
of the property rights to the land. The subsequent value function can be
stated as the following:
Vt (At + yt) = Max {u (ct) + βEtVt+1 [(1 + rt) (At + yt − ct)
+S (l, ki) y (xt)] + λt (At + yt − ct)} (1.4)
where applying the envelope theorem yields the expression
Et−1
dVt
dxt−1
= Et−1
[
β (1 + rt)V
′
t+1 + λt
]
S (l, ki)
∂y
∂xt−1
. (1.5)
The value function is increasing in its arguments and the Lagrange multiplier
is non-negative, so for any non-zero value of equation 1.5, the sign will depend
on the sign of ∂y
∂xt−1
. This framework is useful in that it delineates the impact
of the portfolio choice on the value of consumption. The assumption of
separability between consumption and production holds in this setting and
allows a more isolated characterization of the investment problem with more
attention focused on the income component yt as a function of the portfolio
choice. In this setup Sl > 0.
3 If the producer retains his land after the
ﬁrst period, he chooses variable inputs to be used in the second period at a
positive and convex cost wt (qi)and solves the following problem:
yt (ki) = Max
qi
{xt−1 (qi, ki)− wt (qi)} (1.6)
By the envelope theorem and the ﬁrst-order condition to equation 1.6, it is
clear that dyt
dki
= ∂xt−1
∂ki
, implying that the marginal eﬀect of investment impacts
income the same way it impacts the portfolio choice to diversify into more
productive activities. A positive sign on the marginal eﬀect of investment
would indicate that diversiﬁcation into additional activities is increased by
the introduction of ﬁxed assets, raising income; whereas a negative sign would
3In certain cases, it is possible that more investments on the land increase the proba-
bility of producer retaining his land in the second period (i.e. Sk > 0). Although this is
not necessarily the case in general, and it is not the case for the quilombola producers.
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imply that the investments are concentrated into fewer productive activities,
yielding less income than would a more diversiﬁed portfolio strategy. Given
that income is increasing and concave in investment (i.e. dyt/dki > 0 and
d2yt/dk2i < 0), the sign will be positive. Such behavior is representative of a
pull response to some factor, which raises income for households that are
able to enter into new markets through the strategic investment into some
ﬁxed asset.
In the ﬁrst period the producer selects the level of investment, where the
expected return to investment is related to the strength of land tenure as
depicted by the following program:
Vt (l) = Max
ki
{S (l, ki (l)) yt (ki (l))− ht (ki (l))} . (1.7)
By the envelope theorem, the expected value of the return to an optimal
investment changes with the strength of land tenure by:
dVt
dl
=
∂S
∂l
yt (l) > 0.
Therefore, it is clear that the return to investment is dependent upon the
strength of land tenure. Given the result that the optimal investment will
be determined by the status of the property rights to the land, it is possible
to restate equation 1.6 in terms of the strength of land tenure to illustrate
the role of land tenure as a determinant of resource allocation in the port-
folio choice decision to diversify. Re-consider the producer's second period
problem as the following:
yt (l) = Max
qi
{xt−1 (qi (ki (l)) , ki (l))− wt (qi(ki(l))} (1.8)
where applying the envelope theorem once more yields the expression:
dy
dl
=
∂xt−1
∂ki
dki
dl
=
dxt−1 (ki (l))
dl
(1.9)
indicating that the marginal eﬀect of strength in land tenure on income is
equivalent to the marginal eﬀect of land tenure on diversiﬁcation. By the
result of equation 1.6, it is clear that ∂xt−1/∂ki > 0. Therefore, the sign of the
marginal eﬀect of land tenure on income diversiﬁcation will have the same
sign as the marginal eﬀect of land tenure on investment (i.e. sign {dxt−1/dl} =
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sign {dki/dl}).
The central idea that motivates the conceptual model and the ensuing
reduced-form empirical model stems from the fact that land tenure does not
act directly upon income. Landholders and producers do not instantaneously
receive a change in income upon receiving title to their lands. Rather, land
tenure security operates through economic mechanisms that render an ef-
fect on income. Investment demand is stimulated by secure property rights,
and investments are channeled through productive activities that generate
income. The result of the conceptual model indicates that the causal eﬀect
of land tenure on income is observed indirectly through the causal eﬀect of
land tenure security on the selection of an activity portfolio. And because
of the interwoven relationship among assets, activities, and income, it is also
possible to deduce the causal eﬀect of land tenure security on the related
investment decisions corresponding to the choice of productive activity.
1.5 Data Description and Identiﬁcation Strategy
The data originate from the Secretaria da Agricultora Familiar DAP (De-
claração de Aptidão ao PRONAF) database, sourced from the Brazilian Mi-
nistério de Desenvolvimento Agraria. The DAP database is comprised of
administrative data submitted by agricultural households in application to
the government's rural credit program, PRONAF. The program is structured
to ﬁnance projects for agricultural households seeking assistance with har-
vest costs or upcoming expenses associated with investments into productive
machinery, equipment or infrastructure at a low interest rate. If the pro-
posed project is approved for ﬁnancing, the terms of the credit contract are
speciﬁed based on the data entered into the DAP by the applicant. The
DAP database is merely a registry of all applicants seeking a declaration of
eligibility and does not indicate acceptance into the program. The data set
used in this study is constructed from a cross-section of the 4,013 quilombola
applicants listed in the registry as of December 31, 2009. All data reported
is a summarized account of the applicant's performance and activity during
the ﬁscal period prior to the date of entry into the registry.
Quilombolas fall into one of four categories that are used as the measures
of land tenure: tenancy applies to producers who operate the land holding
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under a rental contract; occupancy is applicable to cases where informal
claims to the land are made and an land fee is paid to the government to
indicate possession of the land holding; resettlement by the government's
national agrarian land reform plan (PNRA) guarantees that the land cannot
be expropriated and that land title will be granted in the future; deﬁnitive
title provides exclusive rights to the land.
Although investment demand is not directly observable in the data set
through a measure of investments, it is possible to identify whether invest-
ments have been made by separating out certain types of income producing
activities that require ﬁxed and/or maturing assets. For example, instead of
indicating whether a producer has planted a tree as part of an investment
strategy, I indicate whether the producer earns income from fruit tree culti-
vation, and thereby it becomes evident that investments were made in the
form of planting trees.4 The rationale behind this lies in the reasoning that
strengthening property rights would induce households into shifting invest-
ments away from movable capital and into ﬁxed assets (Carter and Olinto,
2003).
This process is carried out for all relevant production activities to create
a binary variable of investment activities (i.e. activities known to require
ﬁxed investments.) The number of investment activities that each producer
is involved in is counted to generate a variable measuring the extent of diver-
siﬁcation into such activities. Investment activities include: fruit cultivation;
agro-industrial processing of goods; coﬀee; cacao; raising livestock for meat
or dairy production (excluding poultry); rural tourism; and other perma-
nent cropping/growing activities (e.g. ﬂowers, etc). The investment of ﬁxed
assets such as trees has been previously identiﬁed as important investment
option that depends on the strength of land tenure (Fenske, 2011). A general
measure of diversiﬁcation is also constructed based on a more aggregate list
of productive income activities included in the data set. General activities
include: agricultural production; mining; forest excavation; and wage labor.
The classiﬁcation is designed to draw distinctions between activities that
utilize moveable versus attached capital, as described by Carter and Olinto
(2003).
Additional control variables include a gender identiﬁer indicating whether
4Income earned as a laborer in an activity is not included in the variable construction
of diversiﬁcation in investment activities.
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or not the primary applicant listed in the DAP registry is a male or not. Since
PRONAF is targeted towards agricultural households, family size is included
as well as a variable denoting the number of permanent employees hired by
each producer to account for labor allocations. Also included is the natural
logarithm of the land area operated by each producer to account for diﬀer-
ences in the size of land holdings. I include an array of dummy variables
indicating the highest level of educational attainment completed by the pri-
mary applicant: literacy; primary school; secondary school; technical school;
superior school (i.e. a specialized college degree.) Social capital is charac-
terized by a dummy variable denoting the primary applicant's membership
in a cooperative and/or a quilombo association. And ﬁnally, unobserved lo-
cal level eﬀects are controlled for by the inclusion of a municipality index
(i.e. municipio) indicating the most disaggregated level available of where
the applicant lives.
Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics for producers found in each cat-
egory of land tenure. There is large income disparity for quilombolas within
each category of land tenure. Interestingly, the summary statistics fail to re-
veal that quilombolas with deﬁnitive land title have either the highest mean
or median income. On the contrary, tenure security categories that pro-
vide weaker land rights such as resettlement and tenancy report the highest
median and mean income levels in the sample, respectively. This counter-
intuitive outlook indicates that if indeed deﬁnitive title is the most welfare
enhancing tenure category, there is a more systematic process through which
it operates to provide the expected beneﬁts to quilombolas. Furthermore,
the largest and second largest median land holdings are respectively found
among the resettlement and tenancy categories of tenure; while the largest
and second largest maximum land holdings are respectively found within the
occupancy and deﬁnitive title tenure categories. The average share of income
derived from investment activities is the highest for the deﬁnitive title cate-
gory at 26 percent, followed by the tenancy category at 24 percent. This may
suggest that more investment occurs when a deﬁnitive title is held. However,
a more critical analysis remains to be conducted in order to substantiate this
claim.
The conceptual formulation of the portfolio diversiﬁcation problem sug-
gests an endogeneity problem with respect to inﬂuence of land tenure secu-
rity on diversiﬁcation. Recall that income is a function of the portfolio choice
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics by Land Tenure Category
Land
tenure
status Statistic
Total
income
(R$)
Share of
income
from
investment
activities
Number of
activities
Number of
investment
activities
Land area
(Hectares) Family size
Number of
employees
Deﬁnitive
title
Mean 6,260.76 0.26 2.72 0.76 1,105.12 4.43 0.54
Std. dev. 15,973.64 0.34 1.70 1.02 22,986.38 2.07 0.50
Min 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Med 2,740.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 5.00 4.00 1.00
Max 347,260.00 1.00 9.00 6.00 600,000.00 14.00 1.00
N 1,285 1,285 1,285 1,285 1,285 1,285 1,285
Settled by
PNRA
Mean 6,813.80 0.10 3.57 0.17 31.90 3.31 0.04
Std. dev. 2,587.98 0.28 1.20 0.48 37.33 1.30 0.21
Min 480.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 3.00 1.00 0.00
Med 7,200.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 25.00 3.00 0.00
Max 19,250.00 1.00 10.00 3.00 240.00 8.00 1.00
N 134 134 134 134 134 134 134
Occupancy
Mean 4,253.72 0.14 2.14 0.34 639.33 4.24 0.64
Std. dev. 6,403.54 0.30 1.60 0.67 22,404.16 1.99 0.48
Min 3.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.10 1.00 0.00
Med 3,400.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 3.00 4.00 1.00
Max 160,078.30 1.00 9.00 5.00 800,000.00 34.00 1.00
N 1,275 1,275 1,275 1,275 1,275 1,275 1,275
Tenancy
Mean 9,007.90 0.22 1.90 0.43 19.73 4.18 0.58
Std. dev. 21,136.70 0.35 1.10 0.63 33.92 2.03 0.50
Min 80.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.60 1.00 0.00
Med 2,045.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 7.10 4.00 1.00
Max 220,000.00 1.00 6.00 3.00 240.00 11.00 1.00
N 146 146 146 146 146 146 146
Source: Author's calculations from the Declaração de Aptidão ao PRONAF (DAP) database
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from the previous period and portfolio choice is a function of strength of land
tenure, as depicted by:
xit = xt (l, z) + vt
yt+1 = y (xt, z) + ut+1
(1.10)
where z is a vector of exogenous covariates representing producer attributes,
vt is the random error component of the diversiﬁcation equation, ut+1is the
random error term in the income equation. Portfolio choice is likely to be
correlated with the error component of the income equation, which will yield
biased estimates of the eﬀect of diversiﬁcation on income. Thus, I employ an
instrumental variables speciﬁcation for the income equation, using the land
tenure measure and the exogenous variables found in z as instruments for
the diversiﬁed portfolio choice variable. I identify the eﬀect of land tenure
security on diversiﬁcation, and therefore investment, by estimating the coef-
ﬁcients for the land tenure measure in the ﬁrst stage portfolio diversiﬁcation
equation (i.e. equation 1.9). The eﬀect of diversiﬁcation, conditional on land
tenure security, can then enter into the income equation. The estimated
coeﬃcient on the portfolio diversiﬁcation variable in the income equation
identiﬁes the role of diversiﬁcation on expected income (i.e. ∂yt/∂xt−1from
equation 1.5). The same procedure can be carried out to identify the eﬀect
of diversiﬁcation on income variability, conditional on land tenure security.
However, caution is needed in the speciﬁcation of the ﬁrst stage regression
on diversiﬁcation. It is not suitable to apply a linear model to estimate the
diversiﬁcation equation due to the count structure of the variable (Cameron
and Trivedi, 1986). In fact, misspecifying the portfolio choice estimation
results in erroneously accepting the assumption that portfolio diversiﬁcation
enters exogenously into the income equation. Table 1.2 displays the results
of the Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity of both the general diversiﬁcation
variable and the investment activity variable (Hausman, 1978). Specifying
a nonlinear count model for the diversiﬁcation variable conﬁrms that the
endogeneity bias must be corrected.
Since this study makes use administrative data from the DAP database, at
ﬁrst glance, it is reasonable to expect there to be problems with self-selection
bias (Heckman, 1979). That is, some quilombolas in this data set are seeking
a means to invest by applying to PRONAF, in which case examining the eﬀect
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Table 1.2: Wu-Hausman Test for Endogeneity
General income diversiﬁcation Investment activity diversiﬁcation
Linear model Nonlinear model Linear model Nonlinear model
F-statistic 1.02 5.03** 1.65 4.96**
Source: Author's calculations
Note: **Signiﬁcant at the 5% level
of land tenure security on investment could be confounded by the inherent
inclination to invest found within the sample. This would be problematic in
that it would limit the universality of the results for quilombola producers
outside of the sample, as well as any chance of extending the results to
hold for all agricultural households. The presence of such sample selection
bias would raise the magnitude of the eﬀect of land tenure on investments
and reduce the implications of the ﬁndings to apply only to a subset of
quilombolas producers sharing the attributes that would lead them to select
or be selected to participate in an agricultural ﬁnancing program, such as
PRONAF.
However, the problem of self-selection bias is not a real concern in this
analysis with the given data. The reason being that although the data orig-
inate from an administrative database, the data represents an accounting
of activities and income generated for the period prior to the selection into
the program. The analysis simply takes advantage of the available data that
exhibits the household characteristics that relate to the intended measurable
eﬀect of land tenure. The data used originates from a sample that is col-
lected at a point of pre-selection into the program. That is, the applicants
have not chosen to participate nor been chosen to participate in the program
at the point the data was collected. Therefore, investment behavior derived
from the data used in this study is exogenous to the choice to participate
in PRONAF, rendering self-selection bias irrelevant in this setting. Further-
more, the analysis utilizes data that describes the attributes of quilombola
producers that would apply to PRONAF in order to achieve the means to
invest, with the expectation of some gain from the process. Thus, the re-
sults of this study can be extended to all producers with the characteristics
that would lead them to pursue ﬁnancial assistance for agricultural projects,
which is likely to cover many producers throughout the developing world.
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1.6 Evidence of Land Tenure Security Inﬂuencing
Diversiﬁcation and Investment
1.6.1 A Descriptive Analysis of the Data
Standard producer portfolio diversiﬁcation theory posits that increased di-
versiﬁcation of income reduces expected income (Bardhan and Udry, 1999).
However, in some cases producers may actually realize an increase in ex-
pected income from diversiﬁcation. Producers motivated to further diversify
their portfolios by pull-factors would likely experience greater aggregate
returns from new market activity. So called pull-factors driving diversi-
ﬁcation refer to the emergence of strategic complementarity in production
across activities or a new ability to specialize due to the introduction of an
advanced technology (Barrett, Reardon, and Webb, 2001). However, in other
cases expected income may decline due to losses in productivity that occurs
from spreading out scarce resources across additional activities. Under such
circumstances, diversiﬁcation is likely to be driven instead by push-factors.
Enhanced competitive positioning due to fewer wealth constraints would al-
low more diversiﬁcation into higher return markets and draw noticeable dis-
tinctions between wealthier and poorer producers. Ultimately, producers
with greater liquid wealth can respond more readily to new market oppor-
tunities and take advantage of complementary advantages across productive
activities.
While observing initial wealth can indicate a priori the prospective types
of diversiﬁcation available to a producer, observing income streams ex post
can signal the type of diversiﬁcation a producer previously opted to engage
in. Examining diversiﬁcation in relation to income, as opposed to in terms of
initial wealth, provides greater insight into the outcomes of producer choice,
and leads to greater clarity about how to distinguish between these two driv-
ing factors behind diversiﬁcation. Figure 1.1 depicts the relationship between
average income and diﬀerent levels diversiﬁcation, based on the general group
of income activities.5 It is apparent that while both poorer and wealthier
producers diversify, there is generally more diversiﬁcation apparent amongst
producers reaching higher income levels. Where diversiﬁcation is observed
5See footnote 4 above.
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Figure 1.1: Aggregate Activity Portfolio Size and Income
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Source: Author's calculations from Declaração de Aptidão ao PRONAF
(DAP) database
to be high among the low income producers, it is reasonable to expect the
observed diversiﬁcation to be part of a risk coping strategy, as opposed to the
capitalization of some complementary advantage that allows entry into higher
return markets. Additionally, the apparent gap in income among diversifying
producers may further imply that there is some other characteristic beyond
attained income or initial wealth that is associated with the performance of
a diversiﬁed portfolio, indicating that diversiﬁcation alone is not enough to
raise income.
The willingness and the ability to use long-term investments would cer-
tainly be a diﬀerential factor in determining the feasible production activi-
ties available to producers, with implications for the subsequent returns from
these activities. The relationship between income and investments into ac-
tivities requiring ﬁxed assets is highlighted further in ﬁgure 1.2. It is evident
that diversiﬁcation into such activities increases with average income, indi-
cating that income is positively correlated with the type of diversiﬁcation
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that involves activities utilizing ﬁxed and/or maturing investments. Clearly,
higher levels of wealth make investing into long-term assets more plausible,
reinforcing the expectation that more investments are made by wealthier
producers.
Nevertheless, wealth and investment into ﬁxed assets naturally work to-
gether to inﬂuence the type of diversiﬁcation taken on by producers. Al-
though, accumulated wealth and income are really outcomes of production
decisions whereas investment choices usually accompany or even precede de-
cisions about income activities incorporated into the portfolio. Thus, there
may be other institutional factors, such as land tenure security, that underlie
the decision to make investments into assets that lead to certain produc-
tive activities and promote increased portfolio diversiﬁcation. This cyclical
connection between assets, their related activities, and the ensuing income
streams from the respective activities constitutes the foundation of the cen-
tral hypothesis of this study: land tenure security does indeed promote invest-
ment into activities requiring ﬁxed assets, and as a result, expected income
is increased.
1.6.2 Empirical Analysis of the Data
The implications of land tenure security are explicitly pronounced in the
portfolio diversiﬁcation equation. As previously mentioned, the structure of
the diversiﬁcation variable requires a nonlinear count model to properly ﬁt
the data. Typically, a Poisson model is the ﬁrst candidate when searching for
an appropriate count model and this model will be suitable if the mean of the
dependent variable is equal to the variance, implying no overdispersion of the
data. Table 1.3 displays the comparison of the mean and variance for both
of the diversity measures and includes a measurement of the overdispersion
found in the data. The general income diversiﬁcation variable appears to be
a good ﬁt for the Poisson model, but there is too much overdispersion in the
investment activity diversiﬁcation variable. Therefore, we apply a negative
binomial model to estimate the diversiﬁcation equation for the investment
activity variable.
Table 1.4 illustrates the count model regression results for the diversiﬁca-
tion variables and the marginal eﬀects of the covariates. Given the varying
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Figure 1.2: Investment Activity Portfolio Size and Income
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Table 1.3: Validation of Poisson Model
Variable Mean Variance Overdispersion
Number of
General
Income
Activities
2.429 2.463 0.005
Number of
Investment
Activities
0.500 0.664 0.657
Source: Author's calculations
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spatial eﬀectiveness of quilombo community mobility towards acquiring land
rights, and the varying degrees of cooperation by the Brazilian government
at the local level, it is possible that factors associated with the location of the
producer enterprise may confound the eﬀects of the covariate estimates due
to the endogeneity of land tenure. Therefore, local level eﬀects on land title
are controlled for by incorporating a control function endogeneity correction
that considers the eﬀect of the location of the producer's residence, repre-
sented by the municipio index. There are not enough excludable exogenous
variables to conduct the correction for all four of the land tenure measures,
so the speciﬁcation is only identiﬁed by controlling the endogeneity on the
deﬁnitive land title variable and excluding the remaining land tenure mea-
sures.
I apply a control function approach for correcting omitted variable bias in
a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) context suggested byWooldridge
(2010). the two-step approach ﬁrst regresses the municipio index along with
the exogenous covariates included in the count model on the deﬁnitive land
title variable using a linear model. The residuals from the OLS regression are
then included in the count model speciﬁcation. If the estimated coeﬃcient on
the residuals is found to be statistically signiﬁcant, there is endogeneity and
it must be corrected by estimating the count model with the residuals from
the previous OLS model. Wooldridge (2010) recommends a two step boot-
strap procedure to obtain the standard errors of the endogeneity corrected
speciﬁcation.
Endogeneity testing indicates that the corrected speciﬁcation should be
employed, as table 1.4 reports a statistically signiﬁcant parameter on the mu-
nicipio correction term. Therefore, the results are derived from the QMLE
endogeneity correction model for both investment activities, and the more
general class of productive activities. The estimation results reveal that the
eﬀect of land title is positive and statistically signiﬁcant under both spec-
iﬁcations of the diversiﬁcation measure. Secure land tenure in the form of
deﬁnitive title increases diversiﬁcation within the general class of production
activities by about 3 activities for quilombolas. Furthermore, deﬁnitive land
title increases diversiﬁcation within the class of activities requiring invest-
ment into ﬁxed and/or maturing assets by about 4 activities for quilombolas
producers. The increased diversiﬁcation stimulated by secure land tenure
is substantial enough to conclude that producers are making investments to
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Table 1.4: Average Eﬀect of Land Tenure on Portfolio Diversiﬁcation
Dependent variable Number of income activities Number of investment activities
Poisson model Marginal eﬀects
Negative
binomial
model Marginal eﬀects
Deﬁnitive title 1.365*** 3.322*** 7.945*** 4.026***
(0.346) (0.581) (1.432) (0.301)
Log of total area owned 0.033** 0.080*** 0.035 0.018
(0.011) (0.018) (0.048) (0.009)
Cooperative member -0.738*** -1.796*** -3.696*** -1.873***
(0.200) (0.338) (0.808) (0.167)
Association member 0.311*** 0.757*** 0.258 0.131***
(0.032) (0.060) (0.142) (0.028)
Male -0.028 -0.069 0.018 0.009
(0.028) (0.051) (0.123) (0.026)
Family size -0.010 -0.025 -0.070 -0.035***
(0.009) (0.014) (0.037) (0.007)
Number of permanent employees -0.062* -0.152** 0.111 0.056*
(0.032) (0.056) (0.142) (0.027)
Literate -0.101* -0.246** -0.731*** -0.370***
(0.047) (0.081) (0.209) (0.040)
Secondary school -0.049 -0.120 0.794** 0.402***
(0.063) (0.120) (0.263) (0.056)
Primary school -0.139** -0.337** 0.398 0.202***
(0.050) (0.104) (0.225) (0.047)
Technical school 0.493*** 1.200 3.909 1.981***
(0.149) (1.101) (7.928) (0.322)
Superior school 0.072 0.176 2.234 1.132***
(0.250) (0.608) (2.181) (0.238)
Municipio correction term -1.249*** -3.040*** -7.345*** -3.722***
(0.348) (0.583) (1.431) (0.298)
Constant 0.410*** -3.126***
(0.080) (0.333)
Ln(alpha)
Constant -1.506***
(0.250)
# observations 3995 3995 3995 3995
Source: Author's calculations from the Declaração de Aptidão ao PRONAF (DAP) database
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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accompany a more diversiﬁed activity portfolio. This is especially the case
for the investment activities. Hence, it appears that portfolio diversiﬁcation
and investment demand are indeed increasing in the strength of land tenure,
requiring ﬁrm property rights through land title.
The role of land tenure security in investment and diversiﬁcation deci-
sions is a key step in assessing the value of a diversiﬁed portfolio of income
activities, but the implications for development are further identiﬁed by ex-
amining how these relationships aﬀect expected income. Table 1.5 displays
the regression results from the estimation of the income equation. The ﬁrst
two columns depict parameter estimates for the OLS model that assumes
that portfolio choice is exogenous, and the last two columns portray the
results from the instrumental variables (IV) speciﬁcation to correct the en-
dogeneity.6 The coeﬃcient estimates are statistically signiﬁcant for both of
the measures of diversiﬁcation, but the IV model attributes greater magni-
tude to its eﬀect on income. The OLS estimates an increase to income by
about 5.01 percent for an additional activity included in a portfolio of the
general class of production activities, whereas the IV estimation reports a
27.3 percent increase to income. Similarly, the OLS results indicate a 16.4
percent increase to income from adding an activity to the portfolio of in-
vestment activities, while the IV estimation yields a 58.6 percent increase to
income by increasing diversiﬁcation in investment activities. This indicates
that there is a bias towards zero due to the endogeneity of the diversiﬁca-
tion variable and that neglecting the role of land tenure security in portfolio
decisions underestimates the impact on income.
These results suggest that a more diverse portfolio increases expected in-
come, even more so when the institutional impact of land tenure is considered
as it operates through the mechanism of investment and income diversiﬁca-
tion. However, it does not seem plausible to expect all producers to realize
a nearly 60 percent increase to their income from diversiﬁcation and invest-
ments stimulated by the eﬀect of more secure land rights. Although the
6The ﬁrst stage of the IV/Two Stage Least Squares estimation involves a nonlinear
speciﬁcation to improve the estimation of the conditional expectation function associated
with the portfolio choice beyond the capabilities of OLS. As such, it is improper to insert
the prediction from the count model directly into the second stage income equation as is
the convention with a linear ﬁrst-stage model (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Rather, the
predicted value is included as an instrument for the observed portfolio size variable, which
improves the eﬃciency of the second stage estimation if the count model is indeed more
appropriate than the linear model (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Newey, 1990).
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Table 1.5: Average Eﬀect of Diversiﬁcation on Expected Income
OLS IV
Dependent variable Log income Log income Log income Log income
Number of income activities 0.0501*** 0.273***
(0.0110) (0.0951)
Number of investment activities 0.164*** 0.586***
(0.0206) (0.0984)
Male 0.272*** 0.259*** 0.277*** 0.227***
(0.0330) (0.0329) (0.0345) (0.0348)
Cooperative member 0.968*** 0.955*** 1.026*** 0.956***
(0.125) (0.124) (0.133) (0.119)
Association member -0.0740** -0.0820** -0.294*** -0.230***
(0.0367) (0.0356) (0.103) (0.0505)
Log of total area owned 0.114*** 0.108*** 0.0843*** 0.0754***
(0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0179) (0.0150)
Literate -0.258*** -0.261*** -0.284*** -0.283***
(0.0362) (0.0360) (0.0390) (0.0380)
Primary school 0.00673 -0.0257 0.0953 -0.0582
(0.0621) (0.0616) (0.0772) (0.0647)
Secondary school 0.0339 0.00429 0.113 -0.0260
(0.0700) (0.0695) (0.0845) (0.0775)
Technical school 1.440** 1.193* 1.382*** 0.522*
(0.725) (0.721) (0.506) (0.280)
Superior school 0.928** 0.871** 1.066** 0.805**
(0.363) (0.361) (0.441) (0.361)
Number of permanent employees -0.180*** -0.180*** -0.119*** -0.144***
(0.0340) (0.0337) (0.0456) (0.0377)
Family size -0.00601 -0.00851 -0.0114 -0.0181*
(0.00786) (0.00783) (0.00884) (0.00924)
Constant 7.711*** 7.788*** 7.280*** 7.735***
(0.0557) (0.0513) (0.187) (0.0579)
# observations 3995 3995 3995 3995
Source: Author's calculations from the Declaração de Aptidão ao PRONAF (DAP) database
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.6: Summary of Income Quartiles
Total observations Median income
First quartile
<R$1570 Deﬁnitive title = 1 397 800.00
Deﬁnitive title = 0 605 900.00
Inter-quartile range
[R$1570, R$5365] Deﬁnitive title = 1 537 2900.00
Deﬁnitive title = 0 1471 3350.00
Fourth quartile
R$5365< Deﬁnitive title = 1 351 8735.00
Deﬁnitive title = 0 652 7650.00
Source: Author's calculations from the Declaração de Aptidão ao PRONAF (DAP) database
average eﬀect of diversifying into activities that call for investments is large,
the magnitude may be less for producers typically earning lower levels of
income. To examine this possibility more closely, we divide the sample into
quantiles conditioned on income level and measure the eﬀects of land tenure
for the ﬁrst quartile, the inter-quartile range, and the fourth quartile.
Within the various strata of income, the eﬀects of land tenure security on
diversiﬁcation and investment suggest less uniform implications for expected
income. As depicted by the summary statistics in table 1.6, there are 397
quilombola producers with deﬁnitive land title in the ﬁrst quartile of the
data where the median income level is R$800 compared to R$900 among the
605 producers without land titles in this income strata. Within the inter-
quartile range the median income for the 537 producers with land title is
R$2,900 and R$3,350 amongst the 1,471 producers lacking deﬁnitive titles.
Furthermore, the median income for the 351 producers with land titles in the
fourth quartile is R$8,735 compared to R$7,650 for their 652 counterparts
who are lacking titles. Therefore, only deﬁnitive land title holders among the
highest 25 percent of income earners show a higher median income than their
counterparts without land title in their same income group. This may imply
that the welfare-enhancing eﬀects of land title acting through diversiﬁcation
and investments that are observed for the average of the sample may not hold
for the poorer quilombolas and may only beneﬁt the wealthier producers.7
The impact of land title on diversiﬁcation and investments can be iden-
7Based on the distribution of income in the sample, the set of wealthier producers
are the quilombolas earning an annual income above or near the national minimum wage
(that is, R$5,580 in 2009). Over 75 percent of the producers in this sample report an
annual income below this level.
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tiﬁed for each income group by estimating the same QMLE model for each
respective activity portfolio. Table 1.7 reports the estimation results for the
ﬁrst income quartile of the sample. The eﬀect of deﬁnitive title remains
positive and statistically signiﬁcant for both the general group of income ac-
tivities and the investment group but it is considerably less than the sample
average eﬀect. Deﬁnitive title increases the portfolio size within the ﬁrst
income strata by less than one activity for the general group of activities
compared to an increase by three activities for the sample average. For the
investment group of activities, land title increases the portfolio size by nearly
two activities compared to four activities in the sample average. Table 1.8
reports the estimation outcome for the inter-quartile range of income. Again,
the estimates are positive and statistically signiﬁcant with an estimated six
activities added to a portfolio of general activities in this strata compared
to three for the sample average. The portfolio of investment activities is in-
creased by three activities within this income bracket, compared to four for
the entire sample. Finally, table 1.9 provides the outcome of the estimation
of the fourth income quartile. The estimates for both activity groups are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant but the general group yields a negative estimate while
the investment group yields a positive parameter estimate. Within this in-
come stratum, deﬁnitive title leads to a less than one unit decrease in general
activity portfolio size and an increase by 7 investment oriented activities in
a portfolio.
Using this analytical vantage point, it appears that land title still induces
diversiﬁcation into investment oriented activities, but wealth constraints limit
the involvement of quilombola producers in these activities. Quilombola
producers at every income level become more engaged in investment oriented
activities when they have land title, but the level of their involvement appears
to be proportional with their income level. Equally as interesting is the role
wealth plays in the decision to engage in multiple activities categorized in the
general group. It seems that the poorest producers seem to specialize in a
small number of general cropping activities with a more muted diversiﬁcation
response into additional general activities. However, the poorest producers
do seem to gradually move into more investment oriented activities with
secure land rights. The mid-level income producers appear to greatly expand
their involvement in the general activities, implying that they utilize more
of their available land when they have land title. However, the wealthiest
30
Table 1.7: Average Eﬀect of Land Tenure on Portfolio Diversiﬁcation for
First Income Quartile
Dependent variable Number of income activities Number of investment activities
Poisson model Marginal eﬀects
Negative
binomial
model Marginal eﬀects
Deﬁnitive title 0.189*** 0.444*** 5.268*** 1.989***
(0.0430) (0.101) (1.761) (0.679)
Log of total area owned 0.0365** 0.0858** 0.188*** 0.0709***
(0.0143) (0.0336) (0.0454) (0.0177)
Cooperative member -0.673 -1.580 -16.60*** -6.269***
(0.412) (0.967) (2.410) (1.022)
Association member 0.308*** 0.723*** 0.475*** 0.179***
(0.0438) (0.104) (0.137) (0.0526)
Male -0.0776* -0.182* -0.657*** -0.248***
(0.0428) (0.100) (0.203) (0.0778)
Family size 0.00470 0.0110 -0.165** -0.0623**
(0.0111) (0.0260) (0.0660) (0.0252)
Number of permanent employees 0.0538 0.126 0.818*** 0.309***
(0.0453) (0.106) (0.195) (0.0745)
Literate -0.154*** -0.362*** -0.975*** -0.368***
(0.0449) (0.106) (0.247) (0.0955)
Secondary school -0.153 -0.359 -0.203 -0.0766
(0.0984) (0.231) (0.226) (0.0857)
Primary school 0.0529 0.124 -0.0657 -0.0248
(0.0873) (0.205) (0.266) (0.101)
Superior school -0.465 -1.092 -16.84*** -6.358***
(0.711) (1.668) (2.453) (1.036)
Municipio correction term -4.920*** -1.858***
(1.756) (0.676)
Constant 0.656*** -2.771***
(0.185) (0.462)
Ln(alpha)
Constant -1.175
(2.048)
# observations 1002 1002 1002 1002
Source: Author's calculations from the Declaração de Aptidão ao PRONAF (DAP) database
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.8: Average Eﬀect of Land Tenure on Portfolio Diversiﬁcation for
Inter-Quartile Range
Dependent variable Number of income activities Number of investment activities
Poisson model Marginal eﬀects
Negative
binomial
model Marginal eﬀects
Deﬁnitive title 2.611*** 6.037*** 5.755*** 2.938***
(0.285) (0.665) (0.525) (0.295)
Log of total area owned 0.00928 0.0215 0.0544* 0.0278*
(0.0117) (0.0271) (0.0287) (0.0147)
Cooperative member -1.971*** -4.556*** -4.400** -2.246***
(0.225) (0.525) (1.767) (0.871)
Association member 0.413*** 0.955*** 0.497*** 0.254***
(0.0312) (0.0735) (0.0692) (0.0364)
Male 0.182*** 0.420*** 0.449*** 0.229***
(0.0347) (0.0806) (0.0733) (0.0379)
Family size 0.00917 0.0212 0.0327* 0.0167*
(0.00626) (0.0145) (0.0194) (0.00995)
Number of permanent employees 0.0978*** 0.226*** 0.0626 0.0320
(0.0349) (0.0808) (0.0701) (0.0359)
Literate -0.116*** -0.269*** -0.349*** -0.178***
(0.0401) (0.0929) (0.0906) (0.0471)
Secondary school 0.0507 0.117 0.467*** 0.238***
(0.0705) (0.163) (0.142) (0.0729)
Primary school -0.100 -0.232 0.419*** 0.214***
(0.0654) (0.151) (0.110) (0.0553)
Superior school 0.148 0.342 -15.59*** -7.960***
(0.585) (1.353) (2.050) (1.072)
Municipio correction term -2.390*** -5.527*** -4.939*** -2.521***
(0.287) (0.668) (0.531) (0.291)
Constant -0.191** -2.984***
(0.0846) (0.181)
Ln(alpha)
Constant -1.999
(1.773)
# observations 1992 1992 1992 1992
Source: Author's calculations from the Declaração de Aptidão ao PRONAF (DAP) database
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.9: Average Eﬀect of Land Tenure on Portfolio Diversiﬁcation for
Fourth Income Quartile
Dependent variable Number of income activities Number of investment activities
Poisson model Marginal eﬀects
Negative
binomial
model Marginal eﬀects
Deﬁnitive title -0.0974** -0.269** 11.65*** 7.266***
(0.0421) (0.116) (1.039) (0.755)
Log of total area owned 0.0221* 0.0609* -0.266*** -0.166***
(0.0129) (0.0357) (0.0579) (0.0353)
Cooperative member 0.127 0.351 -3.743*** -2.334***
(0.113) (0.313) (0.406) (0.282)
Association member 0.353*** 0.975*** -0.755*** -0.471***
(0.0420) (0.117) (0.146) (0.0947)
Male -0.00153 -0.00422 -0.488*** -0.304***
(0.0409) (0.113) (0.140) (0.0898)
Family size -0.00293 -0.00810 -0.144*** -0.0899***
(0.00922) (0.0255) (0.0220) (0.0145)
Number of permanent employees -0.303*** -0.838*** -0.569*** -0.355***
(0.0419) (0.117) (0.0963) (0.0658)
Literate 0.177*** 0.490*** -0.482*** -0.301***
(0.0456) (0.126) (0.136) (0.0866)
Secondary school -0.182** -0.504** 2.327*** 1.451***
(0.0821) (0.227) (0.210) (0.150)
Primary school -0.131* -0.362* 0.452*** 0.282***
(0.0751) (0.208) (0.149) (0.0945)
Superior school -0.224 -0.619 2.685 1.674
(0.292) (0.805) (2.575) (1.645)
Municipio correction term -11.15*** -6.954***
(1.036) (0.746)
Constant 0.972*** -2.772***
(0.0577) (0.202)
Ln(alpha)
Constant -2.119
(2.838)
# observations 1001 1001 1001 1001
Source: Author's calculations from the Declaração de Aptidão ao PRONAF (DAP) database
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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producers appear to move away from these general activities when they have
land title. This combined with the more pronounced response for investment
activities suggests that wealthier quilombola producers are able to move into
activities with higher returns that beneﬁt from investments into ﬁxed and/or
maturing assets. These results enrich the outcome for the entire sample by
revealing the intricate eﬀects of land title on diversiﬁcation and investment
decisions as conditioned on the income or wealth level of the producer.
The functioning of land title on the mechanisms of diversiﬁcation and
investments may also lead to a diﬀerent interpretation for the results for the
income equation. Table 1.10 reports the results from the estimation of the
income equation for each income group. In the ﬁrst quartile, there is no
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on income from diversiﬁcation into either the
general activities or the investment activities. In the inter-quartile range the
eﬀect on income is negative and statistically signiﬁcant only for the general
group of income activities. Increased diversiﬁcation for quilombola producers
in this income range reduces expected income by nearly four percent. The
drop in income realized by this group of producers is consistent with the
theoretical predictions made in the development literature dealing with ex
ante risk coping mechanisms. However, in the fourth quartile the eﬀect of
diversiﬁcation on income is statistically signiﬁcant only for the investment
activities and positive. Increased diversiﬁcation into investment oriented ac-
tivities increase expected income for this income group by 51.5 percent. This
considerable impact on income is consistent with the ﬁndings for the sample
average and is likely to be the driving force behind the sample wide eﬀect
of diversiﬁcation into investment activities on income. Hence, diversifying
an activity portfolio and making the related productive investments does not
appear to have any notable eﬀect on the poorest quilombola producers, while
it reduces expected income for middle-income producers, and raises expected
income substantially for the wealthiest producers.
While the ﬁndings for the sample average indicate that the theoretical
predictions regarding the eﬀect of secure land tenure working through the
mechanisms of diversiﬁcation and investment on income hold true on av-
erage, stratifying the sample of quilombola producers conditioned by their
income level indicates that the prediction holds true only for the wealthi-
est group of producers. These ﬁndings suggest that this group of relatively
wealthy producers typify a diversiﬁcation strategy that is driven by pull
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Table 1.10: Average Eﬀect of Diversiﬁcation on Expected Income on
Income Quartiles
IV q25 IV iqr IV q75
Dependent variable Log income Log income Log income Log income Log income Log income
Number of income activities -0.0457 -0.0381** -0.104
(0.110) (0.0175) (0.121)
Number of investment activities 0.127 -0.0665 0.515***
(0.251) (0.0464) (0.0866)
Male -0.00570 0.00749 0.0717*** 0.0727*** 0.194*** 0.0597
(0.0515) (0.0501) (0.0149) (0.0148) (0.0351) (0.0418)
Cooperative member 0.623*** 0.741*** -0.0319 -0.0274 0.833*** 0.630***
(0.237) (0.219) (0.0521) (0.0495) (0.141) (0.158)
Association member 0.0118 -0.0622 0.0117 -0.0101 0.0684 -0.275***
(0.118) (0.108) (0.0251) (0.0219) (0.129) (0.0560)
Log of total area owned 0.122*** 0.114*** -0.0119* -0.0116* 0.0625*** 0.0131
(0.0212) (0.0210) (0.00673) (0.00681) (0.0148) (0.0141)
Literate 0.0386 0.0668 0.0296* 0.0249 -0.159** -0.345***
(0.0602) (0.0572) (0.0171) (0.0166) (0.0669) (0.0541)
Primary school -0.0587 -0.0967 0.0397 0.0599** 0.132 0.0439
(0.145) (0.0861) (0.0269) (0.0250) (0.113) (0.0840)
Secondary school -0.0928 -0.0366 -0.0108 0.00127 0.163** 0.0685
(0.0926) (0.143) (0.0349) (0.0339) (0.0815) (0.0789)
Superior school 0 0 -0.105 -0.105 0.842*** 0.532***
(0) (0) (0.0673) (0.0665) (0.177) (0.158)
Number of permanent employees 0.183*** 0.161*** -0.0183 -0.0218 -0.0416 0.163***
(0.0543) (0.0577) (0.0159) (0.0163) (0.112) (0.0477)
Family size 0.0113 0.00935 0.00347 0.00375 -0.0120 -0.0139
(0.0131) (0.0125) (0.00340) (0.00378) (0.0113) (0.00961)
Constant 6.311*** 6.194*** 8.080*** 8.033*** 9.251*** 8.955***
(0.238) (0.1000) (0.0350) (0.0239) (0.337) (0.0539)
# observations 1002 1002 1992 1992 1001 1001
Source: Author's calculations from the Declaração de Aptidão ao PRONAF (DAP) database
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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factors that correspond with investments leading to better income earning
prospects. Conversely, the middle income producers typify a diversiﬁcation
strategy that is motivated by risk reduction or push factors. Although this
group of producers may show a positive investment response to secure land
rights, the beneﬁts to the investment appear to be truncated by the lack
of specialization. The higher income producers are likely to be involved in
numerous activities utilizing their investments and/or their land in a compli-
mentary way which does not take away from their ability to manage multiple
activities proﬁtably. However, the middle income producers appear to be
spreading themselves thinly across many types of activities that do not sug-
gest any complimentary advantages. This mode of diversiﬁcation does not
allow them to fully harness the earning potential of the investments they are
able to make, thus rendering their income portfolio less eﬃcient, and almost
nullifying the gains from investments.
1.7 Conclusion
Using an administrative data set of a unique set of agricultural households
with varying degrees of land tenure security, this study identiﬁes the eﬀect
of secure property rights on income diversity in certain activities that re-
quire the use of ﬁxed and/or maturing assets. By considering investments
as they operate through income activities, the analysis identiﬁes the bene-
ﬁts of secure land tenure in terms of economic mechanisms and household
welfare strategies, which may be better suited for understanding the impli-
cations of land tenure on household decision making. This cross-sectional
approach serves as a lower bound for inter-temporal portfolio performance.
From this viewpoint, the impact of investment is identiﬁed as it changes the
relative positioning of producers with land tenure title. Although nothing
can be claimed about the aggregate dynamic impact of investments driven
by land title, it is however plausible to expect the beneﬁts realized within the
distribution of the cross-section to increase as assets are able to gain value
over time. The main results suggest that holding exclusive property rights
in the form of deﬁnitive land title is shown to promote both general income
diversiﬁcation and participation in investment-related income activities for
the average quilombola producer in the sample.
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However, stratifying the producers in the sample into quartiles condi-
tioned on income level reveals a more intricate story. Quilombola producers
with deﬁnitive land titles strictly increase the level of diversiﬁcation into
investment-oriented activities, such as food processing, fruit tree cultivation,
and raising livestock, as their income levels grow. Diversiﬁcation into general
types of income activities, such as seasonal cropping, mining, and wage labor,
increases with income, peaking for middle-income producers and declining for
the wealthiest producers. This implies that the asset portfolio, as well as the
activity selection process, is connected to the strength of land tenure and is
conditional on the level of wealth or income. Ultimately, the results suggest
that increased security of land tenure increases the set of income generat-
ing activities and increases investment in ﬁxed and/or maturing assets that
enable producers with an annual income greater than or almost equal to
the national minimum wage to yield higher returns from their selection of
productive activities.8
Income diversity from various productive activities is found to positively
contribute to higher income levels in the sample average. More speciﬁcally,
engaging in productive activities that require ﬁxed and/or maturing invest-
ments appears to be a key determinant in raising total income. Quilombo-
las living in communities with land titles appear to be more likely to en-
gage in such activities, implying that long-term investments are more secure
with land title and that income diversiﬁcation using ﬁxed and/or matur-
ing investments is instrumental in improving welfare and reducing poverty.
Hence, distributing deﬁnitive land title to quilombolas more eﬃciently and
in greater number would engender a systematic process of development that
allows greater beneﬁts from the secured land and resources. Therefore, it
would be highly beneﬁcial to the Brazilian government's objective of poverty
alleviation to title more quilombola land.
Through the previous framework, it is apparent that investment demand
does indeed respond to increased land tenure security. However, land titling
alone is not suﬃcient to raise income levels for these agricultural households.
Although there is a positive investment response for households with land
titles, the eﬀect on income depends on the way investments are utilized.
The way assets are used depends highly on the income level of the house-
8See footnote 7.
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holds. Identifying this multilevel linkage exempliﬁes the functioning of the
assets, activities, and income cycle as highlighted by Winters et al. (2009)
and identiﬁes land institutions as a key underlying determinant in the cycle's
operation.
The importance of land institutions is not limited to the decision to make
investments in productive assets, but continues onward through pivotal eco-
nomic mechanisms that are expected to raise incomes and increase welfare.
The promotion of investment through successful implementation of land in-
stitutions is observed to be channeled through income diversiﬁcation. This
study highlights the functioning of diversiﬁcation as a mechanism that pro-
motes increased returns to producers who can harness complementary advan-
tages from their set of productive assets and become active in higher return
activities that utilize ﬁxed and/or maturing assets. Policy aimed at empow-
ering underdeveloped components of an economy would do well to fortify
land rights and other institutions that encourage investments in strategi-
cally aligned assets that enable producers to work more eﬃciently and reach
higher return markets. To achieve the goal of sustainable development and
poverty alleviation, policy should be informed by an analysis that considers
the full cycle of impacts that will result from making changes to important
institutions in the economy.
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2 Transaction Costs and Threshold Behavior in
Spatial Market Analysis: The Case of
Ethiopian Wheat Markets
2.1 Introduction
Spatially separated, but commercially integrated markets rely on transpar-
ent institutions and a robust infrastructure to keep transaction costs down.
Ascertaining the extent and nature of spatial price relationships provides in-
sights into the ﬂow of information and goods between markets. Poor market
linkages are characterized by persistently high transaction costs which re-
ﬂect the inadequacy of important infrastructure. Market integration is an
outcome of the arbitrage process where agents exchange between markets to
realize gains in excess of transaction costs (Lutz, Tilburg, and Kamp, 1995;
Getnet, Verbeke, and Viaene, 2005).
Eﬃcient exchange between integrated markets will satisfy the spatial
equilibrium conditions deﬁned by Takayama and Judge (1971), also known
as the Law of One Price (LOP). The LOP describes the equilibrium state
where the price spread between integrated markets is equal to the cost of
making the transaction. In this spatial equilibrium state arbitrage opportu-
nities are gone and agents are indiﬀerent to trading. The speed of adjustment
to the LOP state provides a measure of market eﬃciency (McNew and Fack-
ler, 1997). Taken together, market integration and the speed of adjustment
to the LOP oﬀer essential information to policy makers about the impact of
existing institutions and infrastructure on markets.
Spatial market analysis is also instrumental in understanding how re-
sponsive related markets are to changes in supply and demand. In devel-
oping economies, the risk of crop failure in important production regions
may have far reaching eﬀects on prices and food security in dependent areas
linked through trading relationships. The expected duration of regional food
shortages is ultimately linked to the level of integration between markets,
as well as the eﬃciency with which trade can take place (Ravallion, 1986;
Vancampenhout, 2007).
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Clarity on the issue of market integration and eﬃciency becomes highly
valuable when planning emergency food distribution programs in countries
with high risk of drought and incidence of famine. Identifying the spatial
market conditions in terms of the extent of integration and the speed of
price adjustments towards spatial equilibrium is indispensable to policymak-
ers considering implementing agricultural price stabilization policies. Slow
adjustments towards equilibrium can indicate failures of infrastructure in fa-
cilitating the ﬂow of goods as well as asymmetries in the ﬂow of information
(Stephens et al., 2008).
The importance of spatial market analysis in the evaluation of policy has
led to a vast development of methods designed to identify market integration
and the eﬃciency of spatially separated markets. Cointegration methods,
which were natural extensions to Ravallion's (1986) error correlation model
of commodity pricing, were initially selected to test for a stable long-run re-
lationship between non-stationary price series (Alexander and Wyeth, 1994;
Dercon, 1995; Goletti and Babu, 1994; Palaskas and Harriss-White, 1993).
These cointegration models can lead to reasonable arguments for market
integration, but they do not explicitly characterize the adjustment process
to the LOP. However, it is often argued that cointegration itself does not
necessarily imply market integration, and that it is not a suﬃcient measure
(Barrett, 1996; McNew and Fackler, 1997).1 Moreover, standard cointegra-
tion methods do not account for transaction costs and they impose a linear
approximation onto an adjustment process that is piecewise (nonlinear) by
nature (McNew, 1996).
In attempts to remedy this shortcoming, a class of Parity Bounds Models
(PBM) relying on maximum likelihood procedures was applied to model the
spatial equilibrium and account for the role of transaction costs (Baulch,
1997; Barrett, 2001; Barrett and Li, 2002; Negassa and Myers, 2007). While
PBM models explicitly model the structure of the spatial equilibrium and are
capable of incorporating the role of transaction costs, they impose arbitrarily
unfounded distributional assumption about the disequilibrium states and still
impose a linear adjustment path to the LOP (Negassa and Myers, 2007;
1The degree of market integration can be measured by the price transmission rate
as deﬁned by McNew and Fackler (1997) PTRij = ∂Pj/∂Pi ≈ ∆Pj/∆Pi also known as the
short-run market integration measure from the structural error-correction model in Dercon
(1995).
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Vancampenhout, 2007).
Consequently, threshold autoregressive (TAR) models introduced by Tong
(1978) were placed in a cointegration context by Balke and Fomby (1997)
and subsequently applied to LOP and market integration analyses (Abdulai,
2000, 2002; Enders and Siklos, 2001; Gonzalo and Pitarakis, 2006; Goodwin
and Piggott, 2001; Hansen and Seo, 2002). These models provided greatly
appreciated extensions to the standard cointegration approach that more ac-
curately accounted for the role of transaction costs in the equilibrium and the
nonlinear price adjustment relevant to LOP analyses. However, these models
were criticized for requiring equilibrium transaction costs to remain constant
throughout time. Therefore, extensions that relax this restriction have been
oﬀered in more recent applications (Park et al., 2007; Vancampenhout, 2007).
Market integration in the Ethiopian context has been studied extensively
with various methodological applications. Dercon (1995) analyzes white teﬀ
market integration in several Ethiopian markets surrounding the reference
market Addis Ababa using univariate residual tests implying cointegration
(Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests) for the long-run integra-
tion hypothesis and autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) models to measure
short-run market integration. Dercon (1995) concludes that regional markets
are generally integrated with Addis Ababa with ﬂuctuations in the structural
relationship between 1987 and 1993 due to market liberalization and the set-
tling domestic conﬂict. More recent applications found evidence of market
integration between Addis Ababa wholesale prices and Ambos regional pro-
ducer prices by estimating short and long-run parameters using an ADL
model on white teﬀ (Getnet et al., 2005) and white wheat (Getnet, 2007)
prices over the period 1996-2000.
This study explicitly considers the conditions of spatial price equilibrium
between Ethiopian wheat markets and translates them into a dynamic con-
text to assess market integration and the speed of adjustment to the law of
one price. However, to model the Takayama and Judge (1971) concept of
spatial equilibrium, it is necessary to consider the existence of multiple price
regimes in a bilateral trading mechanism. The presence of multiple regimes
reﬂects the state of the system as being either in equilibrium or disequilib-
rium, depending on the position of price spreads and transaction costs in a
given period. Hence, the bilateral trading mechanism so often characterized
through a linear price relation is inherently nonlinear (McNew and Fackler,
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1997). In this framework, the transaction costs given by the LOP represents
a threshold which determines the equilibrium or disequilibrium state of the
spatial price relation.
The study is structured as follows: section 2.2 describes the LOP frame-
work; section 2.3 develops the empirical model; section 2.4 summarizes the
data and gives background on the included markets; section 2.5 discusses the
results; and section 2.6 concludes the study.
2.2 The Model
The standard law of one price provides the foundation for the exposition of
market integration. Formally, two markets, i and j, are in long-run competi-
tive equilibrium with price Pit at location i in period t, and transaction costs
from location j to location i in period t, denoted by τjit. Deﬁne the marginal
rents from trade across spatial markets i and j as pi ≡ Pit−Pjt−τjit. The ar-
bitrage outcomes can be characterized into three regimes based on the price
relationship between markets and the transaction costs involved in trade.
The full system is depicted as:
Regime 1: Pit − Pjt < τjit
Regime 2: Pit − Pjt = τjit
Regime 3: Pit − Pjt > τjit
(2.1)
where the ﬁrst regime depicts a market outcome where the price diﬀerential
between spatially separated markets is less than the transaction cost of trade
between the markets, rendering trade unproﬁtable. If trade does indeed
occur under this market condition, it is ineﬃcient and indicates imperfect
integration with traders making losses in the spatial disequilibrium. However,
if trade does not occur under this condition, the spatial equilibrium still holds
and the outcome can be considered to be a segmented equilibrium, meaning
the markets are not integrated under the tradability condition (Barrett and
Li, 2002). The second regime portrays long-run market equilibrium, such
that the marginal rents to arbitrage are zero. The price diﬀerential between
spatially integrated markets is equated with the transaction costs of trade in
the spatial equilibrium. This implies that all opportunities for arbitrage have
been exhausted and through exchange eﬃciency the markets are perfectly
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integrated. The third regime depicts the case of positive marginal rents
to arbitrage. In this case, although there may be trade in period t there
are unexploited opportunities for arbitrage and the markets are imperfectly
integrated due to the exchange ineﬃciency.
As depicted in equation 2.1, the price margin between markets i and j
are equal to the cost of transferring the good from market i to j when the
equilibrium condition holds ﬁrm in any given period t. Thus, the price margin
can be deﬁned as Sijt = Pit − Pjt where Sijt denotes the spread between
the prices in market i and j in period t. Therefore, spatial equilibrium is
characterized by
Sijt = τjit, (2.2)
where τjit is the marginal cost incurred from arbitrage. The literature on
threshold dynamics in autoregressive processes has adopted the term `at-
tractor' to describe the role of τjit on the price spread series. That is, despite
observed deviations in any given period, the Sijt series will revert to τjit as
its long-run equilibrium value (Enders, 2010a).
Moreover, the presence of the attractor in the series may also result in
nonlinear adjustment paths for deviations on either side of the long-run equi-
librium value. In the context of spatial arbitrage, the long-run equilibrium
corresponds to regime 2 in equation 2.1 where the LOP holds. The adjust-
ment to the LOP occurs when the state of the price relationships is charac-
terized by either regime 1 or regime 3 in equation 2.1. Hence the attractor
τjit acts as a threshold which the price margin crosses as it moves into either
regime 1 or regime 3. The error correction is nonlinear or asymmetric if
the adjustment path toward the equilibrium moves at a diﬀerent rate across
the various regimes. This structure of the economic model becomes quite
appealing since asymmetric adjustment around an attractor could imply dif-
ferent behavioral schemes for traders across regimes where the price margins
between markets are above and below transactions costs.
2.3 Empirical Model
Market integration establishes a proportional price relationship between spa-
tial markets (Getnet et al., 2005). Threshold models of nonlinear spatial price
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relationships allow researchers to more accurately measure the proportional
price relationship between spatially integrated markets. The foundation of
the TAR models is the unit-root and cointegration properties of the data.
Cointegration analysis is based upon the assumption that two non-stationary
series which are integrated of the same order share a proportional relationship
in the long-run despite short-run deviations from this relationship (Enders,
2010a). However, standard tests for cointegration have been shown to be
misspeciﬁed when there is indeed asymmetric adjustment towards the long-
run equilibrium (Enders and Siklos, 2001). Similarly, Dickey-Fuller tests for
unit-roots in a univariate time-series will have low power in the presence of
nonlinearities, failing to reject the null hypothesis of a unit-root too often
(Enders and Granger, 1998). Therefore, if the time series properties of the
data are consistent with these standard cointegration requirements, it is pos-
sible to investigate the nature of the adjustment process towards the long-run
equilibrium value of the spread, or the attractor, to consider the nonlinear
applications to cointegration.
Following, Engle and Granger (1987), the relationship between two non-
stationary prices can be expressed in terms of the dynamic long-run equilib-
rium between markets i and j as:
Pit = α + βPjt + µt (2.3)
where α is the deterministic constant term representing ﬁxed costs of trade
between markets, β is the slope parameter representing the long-run response
of Pit from a change in Pjt, and µt is the random serially uncorrelated error
term with mean zero and a constant variance. A stable long-run relationship
between these two markets would imply that residuals from equation 2.3,
characterized by the series {µt}, are stationary. Using this framework, the
price margin Sijt is formed by assuming α = 0 and β = 1.
These assumptions modify the interpretation of equation 2.3 in several
ways. First, the long-run relationship is no longer characterized by the resid-
uals from the estimation of equation 2.3, but rather the long-run value of the
transaction costs from the series {τjit}. Second, the assumption is now that
the prices are perfectly transmitted in the long-run log-linear representation
of equation 2.3. Third, the price spread model assumes that all transaction
costs are value-based and proportional to prices in market i (Dercon, 1995).
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Transaction costs may rise proportionally to price changes as the demand for
working capital to ﬁnance purchases and storage increases or as the demand
for transportation and other marketing services increases (Fafchamps and
Hill, 2008).
Furthermore, employing the above assumptions in the construction of the
price spread enables cointegration testing to be conducted through unit-root
testing of the {Sijt} series. The inherent relationship between the stan-
dard Engle-Granger (1987) cointegration testing procedure and the standard
Dickey-Fuller approach to unit-root testing in this context gives the following
speciﬁcation:
∆St = ρSt−1 + εt (2.4)
where εt is a white noise innovation process. The subscripts are dropped
for ease of exposition. The standard procedure entails the estimation of
the parameter ρ and testing the null hypothesis that ρ = 0 to ascertain
the stationarity of the {St} series.2 If the series is found to be stationary
and void of a unit-root process, the two price series can be concluded to
be cointegrated. Therefore, by the Granger representation theorem, an error
correction model exists for the two price series, leading them to symmetrically
adjust to a long-run equilibrium along a linear path (Enders, 2010a).
However, as previously stated, if the adjustment towards the equilibrium
is truly asymmetric, the standard Dickey-Fuller test is misspeciﬁed (Enders
and Granger, 1998). It seems quite restrictive to assume that prices adjust
to the LOP at the same rate in response to deviations that carry the price
margin into regime 1 as opposed to regime 3 in equation 2.1. To allow the
possibility of asymmetric adjustment out of each regime, equation 2.4 can be
modiﬁed by specifying:
∆St =
M∑
q=1
Iqt ρq (St−d − τq) +
p−1∑
k=1
γp∆St−k+εt (2.5)
2Clearly, it is possible to extend the model in equation (2.4) to include lagged changes
of St. In this case it may be more suitable to introduce p-th order lagged diﬀerences and
specify equation (2.4) as ∆St = ρSt−1 +
p−1∑
k=1
γp∆St−k+εt (Enders and Granger, 1998).
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where Iqt is a Heaviside indicator for a TAR model withM regimes such that
Iqt =
 1 if τq ≥ St−1 ≥ τq−10 otherwise , (2.6)
and τq is the threshold of the system such that τ0 = −∞ and τM = ∞.
The delay parameter d denotes the timing of the adjustment in the switch-
ing regime.3 In this framework, the variance of the innovation term, εt, is
assumed not to diﬀer across regimes. From this it is clear that the standard
Dickey-Fuller model in equation 2.4 is just a special case of equation 2.5 and
2.6 where M = 1. And therefore, ρq measures the speed of adjustment or
decay towards the threshold (attractor) when the price spread is in regime q.
Clearly in regime 2, there should be no adjustment since the system will be
in equilibrium, satisfying the LOP condition. This generalized formulation
is applicable to the case where the LOP is characterized by two (or more)
long-run equilibrium thresholds and a neutral band (Goodwin and Piggott,
2001; Park et al., 2007; Vancampenhout, 2007), as well as the simpler case
of a single long-run equilibrium threshold.
Enders and Granger (1998) also illustrate a further modiﬁcation of equa-
tion 2.5 and 2.6 where the attractor has a linear deterministic trend com-
ponent. This case corresponds to the case of time-varying thresholds which
provides the basis for the model developed by Park et al. (2007). Adding the
deterministic trend re-characterizes the autoregressive model as:
∆St =
M∑
q=1
Iqt ρq (St−d − τq − θq (t− 1)) +
p−1∑
k=1
γp∆St−k+εt (2.7)
where θq is a linear trend term. This implies that the {St} series is a trend
stationary process. In this framework the Heaviside indicator becomes
Iqt =
 1 if τq + θq (t− 1) ≥ St−1 ≥ τq−1 + θq−1 (t− 1)0 otherwise . (2.8)
Additionally, it is possible that the {St} series shows greater momentum
3Although the delay parameter can also be estimated it is typically set as d = 1 for
simplicity (Park et al., 2007). Furthermore, with monthly data, all major changes would
have likely occurred in a single period.
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in one direction of its asymmetric adjustment path (Abdulai, 2000; Enders
and Granger, 1998; Enders and Siklos, 2001). Allowing for this manner of
adjustment alters the Heaviside indicator so that it is dependent on the
change in St−1 instead of the level. The formulation of the indicator then
follows the rule:
Iqt =
 1 if τq ≥ ∆St−1 ≥ τq−10 otherwise , (2.9)
where τ0 = −∞ and τM = ∞ . Models with this structure are known as a
momentum-threshold autoregression (M-TAR) process (Enders and Granger,
1998). The M-TAR model is more suitable to an application where the ex-
act nature of the nonlinearity in the system is unknown (Enders and Siklos,
2001).4 The M-TAR speciﬁcation is also appropriate when there is non-
stationarity in the price spread/transaction costs due to a stochastic trend
component. The presence of a stochastic trend implies that the {St} series
follows a random walk with a drift process (that is, St = τq+θqt+
t∑
i=1
εi, ∀q).
Taking the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the series then leaves the stationary determin-
istic change in the {St} series 4St = θq + εt (Enders, 2010a). Furthermore,
the M-TAR model relaxes the restrictiveness of the assumption that equilib-
rium transaction costs are constant in an LOP framework and can be applied
to a pure trend model with both a deterministic and stochastic trend. An
explicit attractor is not included in the M-TAR speciﬁcation. Rather, the
adjustment paths from each regime can be said to converge on an equilibrium
rate of change in a log-linearized model.
Whether there is a single threshold or multiple, the speciﬁcation of the
TAR model is straightforward if the values of the threshold parameters are
known. However, the threshold is typically not known a priori and must
also be estimated. Chan (1993) proposed an approach to estimate a super-
consistent threshold parameter where a percentage of the series is truncated
to allow the data to cross the threshold. Enders and Siklos (2001) suggest a
15 percent cut-oﬀ on each side. This approach is employed in this study. In
the case of multiple thresholds, simultaneous estimation becomes computa-
4The {St} series could follow a random walk plus noise process or a trend plus noise
process with autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (ARCH) eﬀects in the noise term
as a source of nonlinearity.
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tionally expensive (Hansen, 1999). Enders (2010a) recommends a sequential
approach to estimate multiple thresholds. Bai (1997) shows that sequen-
tially estimated thresholds are just as consistent as simultaneously estimated
thresholds and that the limiting distributions are the same for both methods.
Therefore, the Enders (2010a) sequential approach is used where applicable.
After establishing the long-run equilibrium, its structure, and the nature
of the adjustment process, it is then possible to examine the way the prices
adjust towards the equilibrium by specifying a vector error correction model
(VECM). This can be executed by employing a threshold VECM (TVECM)
speciﬁcation for the nonlinear market pair relations. The coeﬃcient estimates
on the error correction terms from these models can be used to ascertain the
speed of adjustment made by each price to the LOP. In combination with
either equation 2.6, 2.8, or 2.9 the reduced form TVECM speciﬁcation takes
on the following form:
∆Pit = αi0 +
∑M
q=1 I
q
t αiq (St−d − τq) +
p∑
k=1
γik1∆Pit−k +
p∑
k=1
γjk2∆Pjt−k + eit
∆Pjt = αj0 +
∑M
q=1 I
q
t αjq (St−d − τq) +
p∑
k=1
γik1∆Pit−k +
p∑
k=1
γjk2∆Pjt−k + ejt
(2.10)
for markets i and j where α0 = (αi0, αj0) is the deterministic term in the
TVECM, αq = (αiq, αjq)is the speed of adjustment on the error correction
term in regime q, γ is the matrix of coeﬃcients on the lagged diﬀerences of
each price, and et (eit, ejt) is the error term. This reduced form model yields
estimates of the adjustment to the LOP that are drawn from an explicit spa-
tial equilibrium framework. By assessing the error correction estimates from
equation (2.10) I can infer cointegration by virtue of the Granger represen-
tation theorem and identify any weakly exogenous variables in the system.
If either of the prices is weakly exogenous, I can then specify a structural
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TVECM as in
∆Pit = αi0 +
M∑
q=1
Iqt αiq (St−d − τq)
+
p∑
k=1
γik1∆Pit−k +
p∑
k=0
γjk2∆Pjt−k + eit (2.11)
∆Pjt = αj0 +
p∑
k=1
γik1∆Pit−k +
p∑
k=1
γjk2∆Pjt−k + ejt (2.12)
where Pj is weakly exogenous. The structural TVECM provides a measure
of market integration that is based on the estimation of short-run integration
(Dercon, 1995) through the Price Transmission Rate (PTR) between market
i and j depicted in McNew and Fackler (1997) as
PTRij = ∂Pj/∂Pi ≈ ∆Pj/∆Pi. (2.13)
Using this measure, the response in market j to price shocks in market i
can be quantiﬁed. Through this, one can ascertain the degree of market
integration through a well speciﬁed characterization of the price movements.
2.4 Data and Markets
2.4.1 Wheat Markets
This study analyzes the linkages between several wheat markets in Ethiopia.
Wheat is one of the primary staple foods in the Ethiopian diet and it also
constitutes the majority of food aid received in the country. Wheat markets
are considerably heterogeneous and reﬂect the complex demand and supply
dynamics in Ethiopia. Although a deﬁcit production market, Addis Ababa is
often considered the epicenter of trade for the country with distribution link-
ages all over the country (Dercon, 1995; Negassa and Myers, 2007). In cases
where Addis Ababa has no direct commercial linkages between regional mar-
kets, Addis Ababa still serves grain traders as an important reference market
for market information. Figure 2.1 depicts the most common trade ﬂows
among Ethiopia's wheat markets. Typically, trade ﬂows from the Oromia
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Figure 2.1: Ethiopian Wheat Market Flows
Source: FEWSNET Market and TradeProduction and Trade Flow Maps
http://www.fews.net/Pages/marketcenter.aspx?loc=3&gb=et&l=en
surplus regions in the southwest of the country near Shashemene and Bale
Robe towards deﬁcit areas in the east and to the north. There are also, ﬂows
from Amhara surplus markets north of Addis to local deﬁcit markets and
others located in the Tigray region.
Shashemene is an important wholesale market in the south where wheat
is typically brought in from surrounding surplus areas for distribution to Ad-
dis or other demand centers because of the better comparative road infras-
tructure. Bale Robe is another southern surplus market that sends supplies
Nazareth and sometimes directly to Addis Ababa, with some supplies moving
to nearby Shashemene. The Nazareth market is a wholesale and retail market
center, as well as a depository for wheat originating from Bale Robe on its
way to Addis or another deﬁcit region. Mekele exempliﬁes a deﬁcit market
in the Tigray region in the north. The Tigray region is known for persistent
food shortages and is a primary recipient of food aid. Wheat is distributed
through this market via traders arriving from Addis Ababa and other trading
centers such as Dese in the Amhara region. Dire Dawa is a deﬁcit market in
the east on the border of the Oromia and Somali regions where the majority
of Ethiopia's pastoralists are found. Dire Dawa is an industrial center similar
to Addis found along the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway line. Wheat supplies
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in Dire Dawa are sourced from Addis Ababa, Nazareth, and Shashemene.
2.4.2 Price Data
Due to data limitations on pertinent markets, this study employs six series of
wholesale wheat prices in major Ethiopian spot markets and trading centers.
The markets are Addis Ababa (AA), Bale Robe (BR), Nazareth (NAZ),
Shashemene (SHS), Mekele (MKL), and Dire Dawa (DD). In this sample
of wheat markets, BR is the principal surplus market that always supplies
wheat, while SHS, NAZ, and AA are trading hubs that supply and demand
wheat, and DD and MKL are strictly deﬁcit markets that always demand
wheat. MKL also serves as a local commercial center for smaller deﬁcit
markets in the Tigray and Amhara regions. Monthly wholesale wheat prices
from January 1996 through December 2011 provided by the Ethiopian Grain
Trading Enterprise are used. Prices measured as Ethiopian Birr per quintal
are transformed by the natural logarithmic function yielding 192 monthly
observations. There are nine missing observations found in the DD series.
Therefore, linear interpolation is used to ﬁll in the missing data points. Figure
2.2 illustrates the plots of the log transformed wheat prices.
The prices in Figure 2.2 appear to be very volatile with an obvious up-
ward trend. Furthermore, wheat prices spiked sharply in 2008, and seem to
persist for several months. This jump in grain prices during this period raises
suspicion about a structural change in the price series. However, the typical
structural change tests are not appropriate in this setting. Structural change
tests have been shown to have no power in the presence of thresholds, whereas
threshold models have power to detect structural changes in data (Carrasco,
2002). In fact, threshold models are preferred when testing for parameter
instability since a structural break can be captured by a threshold eﬀect, but
other forms of non-linearity cannot be identiﬁed by structural change testing
(Enders, 2010a).Therefore, it is advisable to use the threshold speciﬁcation
to account for potential structural breaks in the current application.
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Figure 2.2: Monthly Wheat Prices (log)
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Table 2.1: Test for Stationarity in Prices
DFGLS test statistic
Market Level
First
diﬀerence
1%
Critical
value
5%
Critical
value
AA -1.959 -7.00 -3.47 -2.941
MKL -1.255 -7.88 -3.47 -2.941
NAZ -2.789 -8.918 -3.47 -2.941
SHS -2.367 -9.095 -3.47 -2.941
DD -1.371 -8.215 -3.47 -2.941
BR -1.946 -8.485 -3.47 -2.941
Source: Author's calculations
Notes: Lag length of 1 was selected by Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion (SBC) for all markets.
2.5 Results
The results from the augmented Dickey Fuller test for stationarity using a
generalized least squares (GLS) transformation on wheat prices is presented
in Table 2.1 for levels and ﬁrst diﬀerences. This form of the Dickey Fuller
test uses a GLS estimation procedure to detrend the data, which has been
shown to have increased power over the standard version of the test (Elliott,
Rothenberg, and Stock, 1996). Clearly, all of the price series have a unit-root
and are I(1) (that is, integrated of order one).
Addis Ababa has historically been taken as the reference market for com-
modity trading in Ethiopia (Dercon, 1995). However, despite the commercial
centrality of Addis Ababa, there are commodity ﬂows from surplus regions
that circumvent Addis on the way to other demand centers in Ethiopia (Ne-
gassa and Myers, 2007). Hence, eight market pairs are formed given the
six markets available in this study, which focus more on prior knowledge
of trade ﬂow patterns, and less on the assumption that everything moves
through Addis Ababa (BR-NAZ, BR-SHS, BR-AA, NAZ-DD, SHS-DD, AA-
DD, SHS-AA, and AA-MKL).5 From these pairs, the price spread is formed
by taking the diﬀerence between the price in the deﬁcit (destination) market
and the surplus (source) market (that is, St = P
deficit
t − P surplust ). These
price spreads are employed in the threshold application to error-correction
and cointegration analysis used to measure the adjustment to the LOP as
5It is however noted that in cases where Addis Ababa is not used as a commercial node
in the trade network, it is commonly used as a source of price information.
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Table 2.2: Summary of Price Spreads (Ethiopian Birr per Quintal)
Market pair Mean Median
Std.
deviation CV Distance (km)
BR-NAZ 70.83 72.85 31.63 0.45 315
BR-SHS 35.39 32.60 29.75 0.84 188
BR-AA 73.50 67.60 42.81 0.58 404
NAZ-DD 34.24 24.25 47.27 1.38 389
SHS-DD 69.68 61.75 51.12 0.73 630
AA-DD 31.56 26.60 47.75 1.51 523
SHS-AA 38.12 31.00 45.63 1.20 248
AA-MKL 35.24 27.50 59.08 1.68 770
Source: Author's calculations
well as market integration.
Table 2.2 summarizes the price spreads. The mean spread is surprisingly
high for BR-NAZ and BR-AA, despite the moderate distance between the
markets. The mean spread for AA-DD and AA-MKL is also low despite the
large distance between the markets. The coeﬃcient of variation (CV) on the
price spread is high for several market pairs (AA-MKL, AA-DD, NAZ-DD,
and SHS-AA) implying that there is more volatility in the realization of the
price spread for these market pairs. Increased volatility may be a sign of
frequent deviations from the LOP if the range of equilibrium thresholds is
tight. On the other hand, higher volatility could also imply that there are
potentially wider margins on a neutral band where the LOP equilibrium is
achieved.
2.5.1 Thresholds and LOP
The argument that transaction costs in the LOP framework introduce the
potential for nonlinear price adjustment was made in section 2.3. From
this it is clear that the long-run equilibrium state of the system can be
represented by a single value or by a neutral band where no adjustment occurs
within its bounds.6 Given the structure of the long-run equilibrium, the
adjustment from regime 1 or regime 3 towards the LOP can occur at varying
rates conditioned on each regime, or at a common rate as in Goodwin and
6The bounds (thresholds) on the neutral band do not necessarily need to be symmetric.
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Table 2.3: TAR Model Selection
Market
pair
Linear
attractor TAR
Band
TAR
TAR
with
trend
Band TAR
with trend MTAR
p-value from
selected model
(H0: ρ1 = ρ2)
BR-NAZ 157.73 159.68 157.45 159.72 158.16 155.01* 0.00
BR-SHS 233.95 232.39 210.98 228.64 210.16* 231.06 0.87
BR-AA 139.93* 141.76 141.64 141.95 141.51 145.39 N/A
NAZ-DD 19.89 18.32 18.46 17.85 17.78* 20.33 0.26
SHS-DD 235.79 227.19 226.33* 226.94 226.55 236.99 0.02
AA-DD 37.54 33.66 23.83* 32.32 25.45 27.69 0.27
SHS-AA 208.45 210.32 208.76 210.35 208.15* 222.03 0.32
AA-MKL 54.40 56.18 53.77 55.58 53.58 53.41* 0.03
Source: Author's calculations
Note: * indicates model is selected by minimizing the AIC
Piggott (2001) and Park et al. (2007). Moreover, the nature of the transaction
costs represented in the long-run equilibrium can be either constant or time-
varying, with the further potential for non-stationarity due to permanent
shocks over time. Therefore, there is an array of potential models that could
reﬂect the nonlinear structure of the LOP framework.
Table 2.3 summarizes the selection process for the most appropriate model
for each market pair based on the minimization of the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC).7 Additionally, the p-values from the linearity test are re-
ported to indicate whether there is asymmetric or symmetric adjustment to
the long-run equilibrium. It is interesting to note that the equilibrium for
most market pairs appears to be best modeled by the neutral band with
two pairs reﬂecting constant long-run transaction costs (SHS-DD and AA-
DD) and three pairs reﬂecting time-varying long-run transaction costs with
a deterministic trend (BR-SHS, NAZ-DD, SHS-AA). Of these market pairs
characterized by a neutral band, only SHS-DD shows asymmetric adjust-
ment. Two pairs reﬂect non-stationary transaction costs given the selection
of the MTAR model (BR-NAZ and AA-MKL). Both of these models show
asymmetric adjustment. And ﬁnally, BR-AA is the only pair that shows a
linear adjustment path towards the long-run equilibrium transaction cost.
The estimated thresholds are presented in Table 2.4 along with the fre-
quency of price spread realizations in each regime. Generally, the thresholds
suggest that transaction costs increase with the distance between markets.
7Generally, the SBC is consistent with these results. However, the AIC is used here
because it is considered to perform better in small samples (Enders, 2010a).
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Table 2.4: Thresholds and Regime Frequency
Market pair τ2 τ1 ∆τ θ2 θ1
% of obs.
in regime
1
% of obs.
in regime
2
% of obs.
in regime
3
BR-NAZ4 -0.011 43.98 0.52 55.50
BR-SHS3 0.273 0.158 -0.0002007 0.0000139 47.40 32.81 19.79
BR-AA1 0.272 29.69 0.52 69.79
NAZ-DD3 0.159 0.101 -0.0000953 0.0000142 60.42 9.90 29.69
SHS-DD2 0.434 0.332 66.67 10.94 22.40
AA-DD2 0.272 0.018 16.67 67.19 16.15
SHS-AA3 0.230 0.160 -0.0001073 0.0000244 56.77 14.06 29.17
AA-MKL4 -0.021 34.03 0.52 65.45
Source: Author's calculations
Notes: 1Linear attractor model; 2Neutral band model (constant); 3Neutral band model (time-varying); 4MTAR model
This relationship can be seen by examining the markets that are paired with
DD. NAZ-DD has the shortest distance between the markets (389 km) and
the upper bound on the transaction costs is approximately 16 percent of
the price in DD. Conversely, SHS-DD has the greatest distance between the
markets (680 km) and the lowest upper bound on the transaction costs (43
percent of the DD price). AA-DD lies in the middle of these two extremes
with a distance of 523 km and an upper bound for transaction costs of roughly
27 percent of the DD price.
The market pairs modeled with the M-TAR approach (BR-NAZ and AA-
MKL) do not give explicit indications of transaction cost levels. However,
they do reﬂect a contrasting relationship between transaction costs and dis-
tance. The M-TAR thresholds can be interpreted as a measure for the rate
of price convergence in equilibrium. That is, the size of the transaction costs
(or price spread) for BR-NAZ decreases by 1.1 percent per period in equi-
librium, while the transaction costs for AA-MKL diminish by 2.1 percent
each period. This suggests that the more distant AA-MKL (770 km) market
relation reduces transaction costs faster in equilibrium, than does the more
proximate BR-NAZ (315 km) relation. Since the mean price spread is lower
for the more distant AA-MKL market relative to the BR-NAZ market pair,
this shows that distance cannot be the only determinant of high transaction
costs.
Given the construction of the thresholds and the related regimes, the
dominant state of the market relation can be identiﬁed with respect to the
frequency of each regime. From Table 2.4 it appears that frequent arbitrage
opportunities exist for BR-AA since the price spread is in regime 3 nearly
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Figure 2.3: Linear Attractor Model
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Source: Author's calculations on data from the Ethiopian Grain Trading
Enterprise
70 percent of the time. Figure 2.3 illustrates the movement of the BR-AA
spread relative to its estimated threshold. However, for NAZ-DD, SHS-DD,
SHS-AA, and also BR-SHS the price spread falls in regime 1 with greater fre-
quency. Hence, there are not many opportunities for eﬃcient trade between
these markets where price margins are above transaction costs. AA-DD
seems to be in spatial equilibrium with more than 67 percent of the observa-
tions falling into regime 2. Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 display the price spread
movements of the time constant thresholds (AA-DD and SHS-DD) and the
time variant thresholds (BR-SHS, NAZ-DD, and SHS-DD), respectively.
Again the M-TAR models require an adjusted interpretation. Since the
M-TAR threshold is rate of change (given the log-linearized model), eﬃcient
arbitrage is more likely in regime 1 as opposed to regime 3 for the TAR mod-
els. This is because as the prices converge at a rate beyond the equilibrium,
transaction costs become less of a barrier to trade. However, in regime 3,
the prices are converging at a slower rate (possibly diverging), which implies
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Figure 2.4: Neutral Band TAR Models
−
.
5
0
.
5
1
1.
5
1996m1 2011m12
Period
Price Spread High Threshold
Low Threshold
SHS−DD
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
1996m1 2011m12
Period
Price Spread High Threshold
Low Threshold
AA−DD
Source: Author's calculation on data from the Ethiopian Grain Trading En-
terprise
58
Figure 2.5: Neutral Band TAR Models with Time Trend
−
1
−
.
5
0
.
5
1
1996m1 2011m12
Period
Price Spread High Threshold
Low Threshold
BR−SHS
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
1996m1 2011m12
Period
Price Spread High Threshold
Low Threshold
NAZ−DD
−
.
5
0
.
5
1
1.
5
1996m1 2011m12
Period
Price Spread High Threshold
Low Threshold
SHS−AA
Source: Author's calculation on data from the Ethiopian Grain Trading En-
terprise
59
Figure 2.6: MTAR Models (∆St)
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transaction costs are rising in this regime. Therefore, eﬃcient arbitrage is
less likely in regime 3. This scenario is reﬂected by the high frequency of
AA-MKL (65.45 percent) and BR-NAZ (55.5 percent) in regime 3 depicted
in table 2.4. The plot of the diﬀerence in the price spread with the estimated
M-TAR thresholds is provided in Figure 2.6.
2.5.2 Adjustment to LOP
The standard approach to measuring the adjustment to the LOP is based
on the cointegration method developed by Johansen (1988). This method is
highly used in the market integration literature. However, this method ig-
nores the potential impact of complex market relationships that may exhibit
nonlinear adjustment paths towards the LOP. Error-correction estimates de-
rived from the Johansen (1988) cointegration method are presented in table
2.5. Based on these estimates, the fastest adjustment to the LOP occurs in
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Table 2.5: Error-correction Parameter Estimates (Johansen Method)
Error correction term (regime 1 = regime 3)
Market pair Source Destination
BR-NAZ -0.0320 0.0594**
(0.0359) (0.0246)
BR-SHS -0.263*** 0.248***
(0.0654) (0.0808)
BR-AA -0.142** 0.0342
(0.0574) (0.0338)
NAZ-DD 0.0614 -0.0797**
(0.0412) (0.0370)
SHS-DD 0.133** -0.121***
(0.0549) (0.0293)
AA-DD 0.0527 -0.145***
(0.0396) (0.0409)
SHS-AA -0.265*** 0.103***
(0.0712) (0.0364)
AA-MKL N/A N/A
Source: Author's calculations
Notes: Market pairs are ordered by Source-Destination
Standard errors are in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
the BR-SHS relation. Relatively rapid adjustment also occurs in the SHS-
AA market pairing. Another limitation of the error-correction measurements
based on the standard cointegration approach is its inability to account
for non-stationary transaction costs or non-cointegrated variables. Error-
correction estimates are omitted for AA-MKL because this pair is not found
to be cointegrated. However, the M-TAR evidence from section 2.5.1 indi-
cates that transaction costs are non-stationary for this pairing, which does
not preclude error-correction. Therefore, an approach to error-correction
measurement that can explicitly model the multiple trading regimes is prefer-
able.
When the price spread is realized in either regime 1 or regime 3, at least
one of the prices is expected to move back towards the equilibrium where the
LOP holds. The adjustment to the LOP is measured by the error-correction
parameter from equation 2.10. Table 2.6 reports the parameter estimates
for the speed of adjustment to the LOP. Only three market pairs yielded a
model with asymmetric price adjustments, while the remaining pairs have
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Table 2.6: Threshold Error-correction Parameter Estimates
Error correction
term (regime 1)
Error correction
term (regime 3)
Error correction
term (regime 1 =
regime 3)
Market pair Source Destination Source Destination Source Destination
BR-NAZ4 0.0307 0.00398 0.0215 -0.00544
(0.0383) (0.0268) (0.0284) (0.0198)
BR-SHS3 0.357*** -0.260***
(0.0705) (0.0852)
BR-AA1 0.127** -0.0110
(0.0495) (0.0292)
NAZ-DD3 0.0701 -0.0975**
(0.0476) (0.0426)
SHS-DD2 0.0106 -0.172*** 0.313*** -0.122***
(0.0680) (0.0375) (0.0834) (0.0461)
AA-DD2 0.282*** -0.231**
(0.0877) (0.0943)
SHS-AA3 0.326*** -0.115***
(0.0793) (0.0409)
AA-MKL4 0.0858* -0.0548 0.0255 -0.0292
(0.0458) (0.0474) (0.0255) (0.0264)
Source: Author's calculations
Notes: 1Linear attractor model; 2Neutral band model (constant); 3Neutral band model (time-varying); 4MTAR model
Market pairs are ordered by Source-Destination
Estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity
Standard errors are in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
symmetric price adjustments to the LOP. However, of the three asymmet-
ric pairs, BR-NAZ does not show a statistically signiﬁcant error-correction
process for either price. Therefore, by the Granger representation theorem,
there is no cointegrating relationship among the BR and NAZ wheat prices.
The remaining market pairs do indeed display error-correction and therefore
have cointegrated prices. The threshold result for BR-NAZ and AA-MKL is
in contrast to the outcome using the standard cointegration approach. As
previously mentioned, the inability for the Johansen (1988) method to ac-
count for potentially non-stationary transaction costs between markets may
thwart the measurement of the error-correction.
It is interesting to note that for SHS-DD, the SHS price makes its upward
adjustment faster in regime 3 than in regime 1. Since SHS is the supply
region in this pair, this indicates that when arbitrage opportunities exist,
there is a rapid supply response which raises wheat prices rapidly in the SHS
market. This asymmetry could not be captured by the standard cointegration
approach. On the other hand, the case of a symmetric adjustment path in
the other pairs is more diﬃcult to disentangle. The symmetric adjustment
path implies that the speed of the price movement is the same in regime 1 as
it is in regime 3. This is the restriction imposed by the standard Johansen
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(1988) cointegration method, although the regimes depicted by the threshold
models are bounded by asymmetric threshold values.
One interpretation of symmetric adjustment could be that bi-directional
trade is occurring without much friction in the movement of goods. This
is a plausible explanation for BR-SHS, which are both surplus markets.
Shashemene has better access to roads that reach major demand centers.
Therefore, this might facilitate the movement of wheat between these two
markets. An argument could also be made for the case of AA-DD because
of the well-established transport infrastructure and the high demand in both
markets (although, the persistent food shortages in DD make this a very
weak possibility). However, it is less likely to be the case for NAZ-DD where
storage in NAZ is most likely to be the scenario. This argument is further
supported by the slow speed of adjustment made by DD and the lack of ad-
justment by NAZ. Nevertheless, it is very diﬃcult to conclude much about
the trade ﬂows in the absence of actual trade ﬂow data. Therefore, it is
enough to say that there is adjustment towards the LOP in most of these
markets.
Furthermore, the speed of adjustment appears to be generally slower in
the standard cointegration models when compared to the threshold error-
correction estimates. Given the seemingly diﬀerent interpretations that may
be rationalized by the threshold models and the standard cointegration model,
it is advisable to use a more objective means of model selection to identify
the most suitable speciﬁcation. To this end, I employ Akaike and Bayesian
information criterion to guide the model selection. The model diagnostics
are tabulated in table 2.7. In the majority of cases, the threshold models are
identiﬁed as the better models. Only in the case of BR-NAZ and BR-AA
is the standard cointegration approach selected. This result is especially ﬁt-
ting for the BR-AA relation since this pair is estimated by a linear attractor
model, as noted in table 2.3, which is the threshold model that is most simi-
lar to the standard cointegration approach. Therefore, the threshold models
appear to be generally acceptable.
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Table 2.7: Error-correction Model Selection
Johansen model Threshold/linear Attractor Threshold w/ trend MTAR
Market pair AIC SBC AIC SBC AIC SBC AIC SBC
BR-NAZ -734.50* -702.08* -723.25 -684.35
BR-SHS -582.343 -549.92 -589.60* -570.12*
BR-AA -809.65* -777.23* -807.75 -775.33
NAZ-DD -928.398 -895.97 -929.31* -896.89*
SHS-DD -708.99 -676.58 -720.51* -694.53*
AA-DD -958.38 -925.97 -963.75* -931.33*
SHS-AA -748.63 -716.21 -752.09* -719.67*
AA-MKL N/A N/A -951.04* -912.14*
Source: Author's calculations
Note: * indicates model is selected by minimizing the AIC/SBC
2.5.3 Market Integration and Spatial Price Transmission
Weak exogeneity found in the reduced form error-correction models among
certain market prices facilitates the examination of contemporary price trans-
mission between key markets. Speciﬁcally, in the NAZ-DD pair NAZ is found
to be weakly exogenous, while MKL is weakly exogenous in the AA-MKL
market relation. These two weakly exogenous markets are particularly in-
teresting because they are primary targets for international food aid which
is unloaded in each market and then subsequently distributed throughout
Ethiopia. Within these pairs, each aid receiving market (primarily in the
form of wheat) is paired with a high demand industrial center. DD is typ-
ically found with substantially greater food deﬁcits than AA, but AA is a
commercial market which serves as a key price discovery location for grain
traders(Dercon, 1995; Gabre-madhin, 2001). Examining the rate of price
transmission from these aid receiving markets to the related markets pro-
vides a basis for understanding the extent of the price eﬀect when aid is
channeled through these markets.
However, to delineate the implications of price changes on the related
markets, it is important to hold each pair within its proper context. NAZ and
DD are known to have a strong commercial link. Market surpluses of wheat
ﬂow from NAZ to DD quite regularly, often along the way to other deﬁcit
markets in the Somali region. When food aid is delivered to NAZ, it travels
along the same commercial route that the locally marketable surplus does
and reaches terminal markets in food deﬁcit areas. This implies that food aid
competes with the wheat originating from market surplus areas, resulting in
depressed prices in the related markets. Clearly, lower prices and increased
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available supply are desirable outcomes when severe shortages lead to high
prices in DD. Conversely, MKL and AA do not have much of a commercial
link if any. Although it is known that price and other market information is
commonly transmitted between these two markets. Nevertheless, AA relies
more on local producing regions to supply its wheat. Thus, lower prices in
MKL would not necessarily result in lower prices in AA.
Table 2.8 summarizes the PTR between markets deﬁned in equation 2.13.
This parameter provides a measure of market integration where information
ﬂows and/or commercial activity links the markets. Generally, the wheat
markets are integrated with each other given the statistically signiﬁcant
PTRs for each pair. However, price movements in NAZ do not fully trans-
mit to DD. Approximately 58 percent of the price change in NAZ is trans-
mitted to DD. Under the assumption that wholesale prices are transmitted
more completely to local retail prices in DD, such incomplete spatial price
transmission indicates that consumers sourcing wheat from the DD market
do not realize the full price beneﬁts of food aid distributions originating in
NAZ. Price shocks originating in MKL seem to transmit even less to AA.
Only 20 percent of the change in prices in MKL reach AA. This implies that
wheat prices in AA are not greatly distorted by price decreases in MKL when
food aid arrives. This outcome is somewhat favorable in this case, since AA
sources much of its wheat from BR, SHS, and other nearby producing regions.
Hence, traders moving wheat from the surplus regions to AA appear to be
insulated from depressed prices in AA due to food aid deliveries in MKL.
Another way to look at this is that during periods of sever food scarcity in
MKL, high wheat prices are not fully transmitted to AA. Again, assuming
that vertical market linkages in the local markets would be transmitted more
completely to consumers, retail prices in AA would not rise sharply when
prices in MKL are increasing.8
Additionally, it appears that AA is highly inﬂuential in the price forma-
tion in BR. More than 70 percent of price changes in AA is transmitted to
BR. This is not surprising given the high demand in AA and the strong com-
mercial link that BR has with AA as a key supplier of wheat. Conversely,
price shocks in BR are transmitted to NAZ at a rate of approximately 34
percent. Again, this result highlights the role of NAZ as a regional hub for
8Note that price transmission is not found to be asymmetric for price increases and
decreases.
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Table 2.8: Price Transmission Rate Estimates
Price Transmission Rate
Market pair Source → Destination Destination → Source
BR-NAZ 0.336***
(0.0306)
BR-AA 0.704***
(0.104)
NAZ-DD 0.577***
(0.0533)
AA-MKL 0.201***
(0.0518)
Source: Author's calculations
Notes: Market pairs are ordered by Source-Destination
Estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity
Standard errors are in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
wheat where local producing regions channel their marketable surplus.
2.6 Conclusion
This study uses time constant and time varying threshold models to measure
market eﬃciency and assess the level of market integration between sev-
eral principal Ethiopian wheat markets. In the absence of transaction cost
data, equilibrium thresholds are estimated to characterize the role played by
transaction costs in a bi-lateral trading mechanism. The average range of
transaction costs is estimated to account for roughly 17 to 27 percent of the
price in the destination market.
The price relation between the two largest cities, Addis Ababa and Dire
Dawa, illustrate the best case for market eﬃciency in a LOP framework. Ad-
dis Ababa and Dire Dawa maintain the LOP condition during most periods.
Market eﬃciency between these markets can be attributed to the superior
transport infrastructure connecting these markets relative to the other mar-
ket pairs. Additionally, the industrial nature of these cities suggests that
telecommunication infrastructure is more developed which aids in the ﬂow of
market information. There appear to be frequent gains to arbitrage between
the largest wheat supply center, Bale Robe, and the dominant demand cen-
ter, Addis Ababa. Price spreads between these pairs are found in the regime
where arbitrage opportunities exist nearly 70 percent of the periods in the
66
sample. This points to Bale Robe as a key source of wheat supply in Addis
Ababa. Relative to Bale Robe, Shashemene appears to play a secondary role
as a wheat supplier to Addis. Gains to arbitrage are found in only 30 percent
of the sampled periods. On the other hand, frequent breakdowns in market
eﬃciency are identiﬁed for several other market relations where price margins
are persistently below transaction costs.
Furthermore, the market integration results yield interesting implications
for food aid programs. Incomplete price transmission from markets that
channel aid ﬂows (Nazareth) to deﬁcit markets (Dire Dawa) seems to truncate
the beneﬁts associated with price stabilization from food aid distribution.
On the other hand, the evidence does not suggest that food aid distribution
would have large price eﬀects on price movements when integrated markets do
not share a strong commercial link, as in the case of Mekele and Addis Ababa.
However, it is unclear why poor price transmission exists between the aid dis-
tributing hub and the receiving market. One potential cause may be poor
infrastructure between the integrated markets. Therefore, infrastructure de-
velopment should be decentralized and diversiﬁed to account for the linkages
between important markets. Even in the case where physical commerce is
less likely to occur in high volume (AA-MKL), improved telecommunication
services should be developed to facilitate information transmission.
One limitation of the current study is that price data is reported at the
monthly level. This limits the interpretation of the results since trading hap-
pens daily, hence price adjustments would have occurred before one month.
Ideally, daily or weekly data could be employed as opposed to monthly prices.
However, data below the monthly level is diﬃcult to obtain for Ethiopia and
most developing countries.
Future research might involve the use of a trader survey that collects data
on trade volume, prices, and transaction costs for each transaction. Higher
frequency data could be obtained from a trader survey with more details on
the decision making of traders. Through this, the issue of proportional versus
constant transaction costs can be reconciled.
Nevertheless, the current study provides useful insights into Ethiopian
wheat markets. The approach adopted in this analysis is a second best
method for modeling transaction costs in spatial market analysis. Ideally,
actual data on transaction costs and trade ﬂows would be used to more ex-
plicitly identify the equilibrium state in the bi-lateral trading system. How-
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ever, obtaining this data is very diﬃcult in the context of developing countries
where high transaction costs and poor infrastructure are more prevalent. Em-
ploying the TAR class models provides a framework for analyzing the role of
transactions costs on market eﬃciency and market integration when data is
limited.
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3 Coﬀee Break: How has the Ethiopian
Commodity Exchange Impacted the
Ethiopian Coﬀee Sector?
3.1 Introduction
During the 1990s market liberalization brought important reforms to agri-
cultural markets across Africa (Temu et al., 2001; Krivonos, 2004). These re-
forms were centered around reducing the amount of control that governments
exercised over markets. The trend has been that with increased market lib-
eralization, economies realized greater market integration and a reduction in
marketing margins, which beneﬁted local producers (Krivonos, 2004; Gabre-
Madhin and Goggin, 2005). Such improvements were the result of increased
commercial activity by the private sector in commodity markets. However,
markets throughout Africa still struggle to manage the challenges brought by
price volatility and information asymmetries between powerful traders and
smallholder producers. Uncontrolled price risk and high transaction costs due
to infrastructural and telecommunication failures are said to have muted the
gains to market liberalization in Africa (Gabre-Madhin and Goggin, 2005).
These problems have been attributed to the failure to establish the neces-
sary institutions to support heightened commercial markets during the era
of government intervention (Temu et al., 2001).
Commodity futures exchanges have long been considered as an option for
increasing the gains to commodity trading in Africa and reducing the expo-
sure to price risk (Ouattara et al., 1990). However, there is uncertainty as to
whether producers in developing countries would be better served by being
oﬀered futures contracts on an international market, or if the best strategy
is to develop a local futures exchange. Mohan (2007) ﬁnds that the cost
of hedging in an international futures market is low, particularly for coﬀee
producers. Rashid, Winter-Nelson, and Garcia (2010) indicate that export
commodities like coﬀee may be better suited to capitalize on hedging oppor-
tunities in an oﬀ-shore futures market since quality standards are typically
well matched to the international market which reduces basis risk. However,
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the viability of using a foreign futures contract to mitigate price risk is condi-
tional upon the ability for exchange rate risk to be managed directly through
market mechanisms (Fortenbery and Zapata, 2004). Ultimately, the decision
to either hedge price risks on an international market or develop a local fu-
tures market seems to depend highly upon who are the targeted beneﬁciaries.
Fortenbery and Zapata (2004) indicate that utilizing a foreign futures market
may introduce increased speculative activity which can adversely aﬀect local
participants with a commercial interest in the cash market. In the presence
of high speculation, hedging in an oﬀ-shore futures market will only mitigate
the risk in futures trading, which beneﬁts hedgers and exporters, but may
actually exacerbate the overall price risk faced by producers and local mer-
chants. Therefore, a local commodity market where futures contracts and
forward cash arrangements can be made in local currency is most likely to
provide viable risk management options for local producers and small-scale
traders.
Since market liberalization took place in Ethiopia, price transmission from
the world to the domestic coﬀee market has been found to be more complete
(Worako et al., 2008). However, despite the improvements after the initial
period of market reform, high search costs for potential buyers and inad-
equate market information systems impeded the performance of Ethiopia's
coﬀee market (Worako et al., 2008). With the help of the United Nations De-
velopment Program, Ethiopia launched the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange
(ECX) in 2008 with hopes of bringing a market based risk management sys-
tem that would eliminate market failures, disseminate market information,
and ultimately enable the Ethiopian agricultural sector to reach its full po-
tential. The ECX was initially targeted towards the domestic grain markets,
but faced challenges in convincing traders to utilize the new market channel
(Rashid et al., 2010). The volume of oﬃcial transactions was too low to
sustain the ECX and attention soon shifted away from grains towards coﬀee
and other export crops. At the moment, ECX does not engage in full-scale
futures contract trading. Rather it is functioning as a forum for centralized
spot market commodity transactions. The physical trading ﬂoor is posi-
tioned in Addis Ababa, with 20 terminal centers and 10 regional warehouses
dispersed throughout Ethiopia (Francesconi and Heerink, 2010).
As an institution, the ECX is targeted to reduce transaction costs in the
marketing system, increase the ﬂow of information, and increase the welfare
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of producers. Improved price transmission from the world market to the
domestic market would indicate that transaction costs have been reduced and
the local market is better integrated with the world post ECX. Furthermore, a
direct measure of the beneﬁt ECX brings to producers is the share of the price
on the international market that they receive. Therefore, this study seeks
to identify the impact of ECX on the Ethiopian coﬀee market by measuring
changes in short and long run price transmission, as well as by determining
whether or not producers are earning a larger share of the world price since
ECX.
The paper is structured as follows: section 3.2 provides some background
on the Ethiopian coﬀee market and discusses some lessons from other com-
modity exchanges in developing countries; section 3.3 discusses the data and
delineates the empirical strategy; section 3.4 provides the results of the em-
pirical analysis; and the paper concludes with section 3.5.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Ethiopia's coﬀee market and ECX
Ethiopia is among the worlds ten largest coﬀee exporters and competes year-
to-year with Uganda for the top position in Africa (International Coﬀee Or-
ganization, 2012). Ethiopia exported over 2.9 million 60 kg bags during the
2009/2010 marketing season compared to Uganda's exports of more than
2.6 million bags of coﬀee. However, during the 2010/2011 marketing season
Uganda surpassed Ethiopia by exporting over 3.15 million bags compared to
Ethiopia's export volume of more than 3.06 million bags (International Coﬀee
Organization, 2012). But despite its large role in African coﬀee production
and exports, Ethiopia is positioned as a price taker in the world market.
Through its Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ethiopia has
been an exporting member of the International Coﬀee Organization (ICO)
since 1960. Aﬃliation with the ICO has supported access to information
about the international market, which the government utilizes in a daily
broadcast of international and domestic coﬀee prices from the previous trad-
ing day. The importance of price information is paramount for smallholders
in Ethiopia because of the rudimentary harvesting and drying techniques that
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are employed. Coﬀee harvested in the day must be dried and warehoused
within 12 hours or it will begin to spoil and lose value. Therefore, a producer
is faced with the problem of maximizing her returns from the sale of coﬀee
based on price expectations given the information at hand.
The ECX has instituted several mechanisms to facilitate the disclosure
of market information to stakeholders using information and communication
technology (ICTs). Price information is displayed electronically and made
available in real time via price tickers posted in regional locations throughout
Ethiopia. Market information is also disseminated via SMS text messaging
technology. The use of mobile phone technologies is quite timely due to recent
growth in mobile phone service provision. Although modest relative to other
countries in the region, the concentration of mobile phone subscriptions has
grown from one per 100 people in 2005 to 8 per 100 people as of 2010(World
Bank, 2011). Moreover, the ECX maintains a website which posts real time
information on market data. However, farmers are less likely to use the in-
ternet as a source of information. Despite the growth in internet usage, only
8 people per 1,000 use the internet in Ethiopia(World Bank, 2011). More
critical to most farmers is the dissemination of market information via other
media such as radio broadcast. With the advent of the ECX, price infor-
mation has increased the broadcast frequency to four times daily(Ethiopian
Commodity Exchange, 2011).
Ethiopia's coﬀee sector is growing and becoming more successful each
season. Coﬀee export volume grew in 2009/2010 by 28.5 percent from the
previous year, which the government attributed to the institutional impact
of ECX (National Bank of Ethiopia, 2010). Currently, the coﬀee market
dominates trading activity in the ECX. Export coﬀee is traded daily over a
four hour interval, whereas the other trading sessions are at most one hour
on designated days of the week. Sesame seeds are traded daily in an hour
long trading session. And grains are traded only on Wednesdays for one half
of an hour(Ethiopian Commodity Exchange, 2011).
The Ethiopian government is highly public about its pride in the eﬃ-
cacy of the state run ECX and its ability to provide incentives to producers
and operate eﬃciently, providing transparency in price mechanisms.1 How-
1See recent article on debates about commodity exchanges in Africa:
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Africans-Debate-Private-vs-State-Run-
Commodity-Markets-133472263.html
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ever, some would argue against the ability of a state operated enterprise
to eﬃciently manage commodity trading, in favor of an institutional design
driven by the private sector. But despite the controversy surrounding the
way the ECX was established, this institution has incorporated some very
well structured systems to improve the markets that it supports. ECX has
implemented several risk management mechanisms to ensue the security of
transactions for its stakeholders. In the new system, trading through the
ECX guarantees a trade day plus one payment schedule for farmers. This
provides a great beneﬁt to farmers who in the previous system had to wait
extended periods to receive payment on the transfer of goods. Therefore, the
ECX can be seen as a formalized institution which provides contract enforce-
ment and reduces information asymmetries between agents. While futures
contracts are not yet oﬀered via ECX, steps are being taken to strengthen
spot markets. Therefore, the foundation for more sophisticated market mech-
anisms is being laid under the current structure of the ECX.
3.2.2 Lessons from China
The experience of Ethiopia is not as unique as it seems. Other develop-
ing countries have made attempts to develop formal commodity exchanges,
with varying success. One case that provides an interesting comparison with
Ethiopia is the experience that China had with its commodity exchanges.
There are some important lessons that Ethiopia and other countries, espe-
cially in Africa, can gain from considering the development of commodity
exchanges in China.
Shortly after the liberalization of China's markets during the 1980s, the
Chinese Government launched its planning process for the institutionaliza-
tion of a commodity futures trading system as an integral part of its trans-
forming economy. During this phase, consultations with well established in-
ternational exchanges, such as the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), yielded
recommendations for the Chinese to develop a wholesale spot market prior to
delving into the complexities of a futures exchange (Williams et al., 1998). As
a result of this advice, the development of the China Zhengzhou Grain Whole-
sale Market ensued in October 1990 and marked the beginning of China's
evolution into the world of commodity exchanges, with plans to oﬀer futures
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contracts down the line. However, the Shengzen Metals Exchange quickly
emerged in 1991 oﬀering the ﬁrst standardized futures contract in China
(Xin and Chen, 2006). Shortly thereafter, in May 1993 the China Zhengzhou
Commodity Exchange (CZCE) began trading in futures contracts for several
listed commodities (Williams et al., 1998). By the end of 2003, the futures
exchange industry exploded rapidly containing over 50 exchanges oﬀering
contracts in more than 50 commodities (Xin and Chen, 2006).
But this remarkable growth was hardly sustainable. Poor governance,
suboptimal contract designs, and ineﬀectual regulations led to rampant fraud,
non-standardized operations, and a illegal market for futures contracts. This
poor performance led to an extended period of reform in the sector. By
1998, the number of exchanges was reduced to three, all licensed exchanges
acted as not-for-proﬁt organizations, the number of commodity contracts
oﬀered was limited to seven, contract standardization and legal enforcement
had improved, and greater restrictions were placed the shrinking number of
active brokerage ﬁrms (Xin and Chen, 2006). These reforms brought about
greater market eﬃciency to a futures industry that was allowed accelerate its
growth faster than its legal and regulatory framework could establish itself.
The lesson from China is that a gradual evolution of a functional com-
modity exchange sector is the most sustainable. It took nearly ten years
for China's exchanges to stabilize under the right regulatory construct and
optimize the design of its futures contracts. Furthermore, China's reform
was made in reaction to over speculation and other problems in the futures
sector as opposed to proactive planning of legal and regulatory designs. Such
complications can be avoided in the Ethiopian context by taking adequate
time to establish the necessary legal and regulatory policies in anticipation
of speculation problems. The case of China further illustrates that in spite of
some initial challenges that may call for large scale reform, an infant commod-
ity exchange can indeed become sustainable and well linked to international
markets.
3.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy investigates the impact of ECX on multiple levels.
First, I measure whether the producer's share of the export price has in-
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creased after ECX. Second, I evaluate the degree of long-run price trans-
mission between the export price and the producer's price while giving con-
sideration to the change in the institutional regime using a cointegration
framework. Lastly, I measure the change in the short-run transmission of
prices from the international coﬀee market to the domestic market in each
institutional regime.
I employ monthly price data for ﬁve key coﬀee growing zones ranging from
January 2000 to June 2011. Speciﬁcally, I consider prices for coﬀee sourced
from Sidoma, Jimma, Limu, Harar, and Yirgachefe. Producer prices are a
monthly average of the price paid to a coﬀee grower by a local supplier before
at a primary market center in a given zone. The export price is a monthly
average of the freight on board (FOB) coﬀee price paid to an Ethiopian
exporter by an international buyer. The producer prices are sourced from
the Central Statistics Authority (CSA) and the export prices are obtained
from the Ethiopian Customs Authority. The ECX was opened for coﬀee
trading in December 2008, so the sample gives 107 observations prior to
ECX and 31 observations under the new institutional regime. I convert the
nominal price of coﬀee from Ethiopian Birr per kilogram to real US cents
per pound by applying the nominal exchange rate from the National Bank
of Ethiopia and deﬂating it by the consumer price index based on December
2006 price levels derived from the CSA. Deﬂation is carried out to reduce
the bias in the cointegration analysis from a common inﬂationary trend in
prices.
The origin of the coﬀee sold at each level of the Ethiopian marketing chain
is tracked by keeping record of the source location on each oﬃcial invoice.
Within each zone there are several quality grades that may be assigned upon
inspection. Historically, there has been signiﬁcant variation of quality within
each coﬀee producing zone. Prior to ECX, the quality of the coﬀee was
classiﬁed by the woreda it was grown in, within a particular zone. However,
in the post ECX marketing system, coﬀee is graded on a numeric scale once
local suppliers deliver it to the ECX warehouses. When processed coﬀee
reaches the ECX trading ﬂoor, coﬀee is identiﬁed by its zone of origin, coﬀee
grade, and whether it has been washed or not. In the current data set, the
prices for all coﬀee grades sourced from a particular zone are averaged into
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the monthly price series.2
The data are summarized in tables 3.1 and 3.2 for producer and export
price, respectively. The Sidoma, Harar and Yirgachefe varieties have high
export prices indicating the premium quality of coﬀee from these zones. Pro-
ducer prices for Harar and Yirgachefe varieties are also high relative to the
other varieties. This suggests that price transmission may be potentially bet-
ter for the higher quality varieties. However, after ECX, Sidoma coﬀee has
a high export price but a relatively low producer price suggesting that there
is an improvement in the quality of Sidoma coﬀee but that producers may
not be beneﬁting from the increased value of their output. This becomes
even more evident in the plots of the prices depicted in ﬁgure 3.1 where it
is appears that Sidoma export and producer prices begin to diverge in 2010,
but eventually move closer together after a few periods.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics: Producer Price
Region Observations Mean Standard Deviation Coeﬃcient of variation
Before ECX
Sidoma 107 59.27 17.84 0.30
Jimma 107 51.33 14.41 0.28
Limu 107 57.98 16.92 0.29
Harar 107 89.68 16.12 0.18
Yirgachefe 107 71.98 17.46 0.24
After ECX
Sidoma 31 45.54 15.13 0.33
Jimma 31 47.79 16.70 0.35
Limu 31 47.00 15.20 0.32
Harar 31 64.47 10.52 0.16
Yirgachefe 31 57.95 14.71 0.25
Source: Author's calculations on data from the Ethiopian Central Statistics Authority
2Obtained from personal communication with Ato Solomon Lemma.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: Export Price
Region Observations Mean Standard Deviation Coeﬃcient of Variation
Before ECX
Sidoma 107 99.93 24.13 0.24
Jimma 107 91.78 19.26 0.21
Limu 107 91.68 21.60 0.24
Harar 107 138.55 31.67 0.23
Yirgachefe 107 101.18 23.68 0.23
After ECX
Sidoma 31 94.65 14.84 0.16
Jimma 31 65.81 11.02 0.17
Limu 31 73.90 19.04 0.26
Harar 31 92.93 5.97 0.06
Yirgachefe 31 110.93 16.51 0.15
Source: Author's calculations on data from the Ethiopian Central Statistics Authority
Figure 3.1: Regional Coﬀee Prices (Real US Cents per lb.)
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Table 3.3: Share of export price paid to producers
Region Observations Mean
Standard
Deviation
Before ECX
Sidoma 107 0.608 0.179
Jimma 107 0.571 0.170
Limu 107 0.639 0.151
Harar 107 0.664 0.118
Yirgachefe 107 0.716 0.113
After ECX
Sidoma 31 0.485 0.149
Jimma 31 0.726 0.209
Limu 31 0.636 0.111
Harar 31 0.693 0.097
Yirgachefe 31 0.527 0.117
Source: Author's calculations on data from the Ethiopian Central Statistics Authority
3.4 Empirical Analysis
3.4.1 Measuring the Producer's Share
In table 3.3 it seems that Sidoma and Yirgachefe coﬀee producers are re-
ceiving the smallest relative shares of the export price after ECX, despite
higher value of both varieties. Harar still has a large share of the export
price going to producers after ECX, while the share paid to Jimma coﬀee
growers increases substantially to near 73 percent.The plots in ﬁgure 3.2 de-
pict the inter-temporal movement of the producer's share of export price for
each coﬀee variety from the above regions. The trend line for the producer's
share of the export price before and after ECX is overlayed onto the share
plots. Observing the plots, it seems like Jimma is the only variety which
increased the producer's share after ECX, while Yirgachefe seems to decline
the producer's share. Beyond these two observations, Sidoma seems to have
dropped after ECX but with no clear trend after this shift.
However, this cursory analysis of the descriptive data fails to consider
the dynamics in the series. Therefore, I construct a more formal test of the
change in producer's share with an intervention analysis by specifying an
AR(1) model of the share variable
Shareit = φi + δit+ ρiShareit−1 + diECX + εit (3.1)
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Figure 3.2: Producer Share of Export Price w/Trend
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Table 3.4: Intervention Analysis on Producer Share
Sidoma Jimma Limu Harar Yirgachefe
Constant -0.479** -0.463* -0.364** -0.230 0.234
(0.191) (0.235) (0.168) (0.160) (0.163)
t 0.00126*** 0.00134*** 0.00115*** 0.00120*** 0.000191
(0.000401) (0.000470) (0.000362) (0.000332) (0.000304)
sharet−1 0.686*** 0.561*** 0.611*** 0.384*** 0.532***
(0.0639) (0.0721) (0.0693) (0.0813) (0.0738)
ECX -0.125*** -0.0218 -0.0804** -0.0626** -0.101***
(0.0387) (0.0397) (0.0309) (0.0291) (0.0333)
N 137 137 137 137 137
R2 0.719 0.520 0.616 0.335 0.531
Breusch-Godfrey (Prob > chi2) 0.8528 0.4963 0.4959 0.1755 0.1946
LM Test for ARCH (Prob > chi2) 0.4917 0.0017 0.0226 0.0713 0.0001
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
where ECX is a dummy variable taking the value of one after December 2008,
and zero before this date. εit is the i.i.d. innovation term for zone i. The
output from this regression is summarized in table 3.4. This model seems to
consistently lead to the conclusion that producer's earn a smaller share of the
export price after the emergence of ECX. Breusch-Godfrey tests on equation
3.1 do not indicate any evidence of autocorrelation for any zones. The null
hypothesis of no serial correlation is not rejected for any zones. However,
further tests for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) based
on Engle (1982) indicate that ARCH eﬀects are apparent for several series.
The null hypothesis of no ARCH eﬀects is rejected for Jimma, Limu, Harar,
and Yirgachefe. Therefore, the intervention analysis on the producer's share
of the export price is modiﬁed to incorporate conditional heteroskedasticity
by the following generalized ARCH (GARCH) speciﬁcation:
hit = α0 +
q∑
j=1
αijεit−j +
p∑
j=1
βijhit−j (3.2)
where hit is the conditional variance of εit, α0 is a constant parameter, αij
the measures the eﬀect of j lagged shocks to the producer share on current
conditional volatility, and βij measures the eﬀect of j lagged conditional
volatility on current conditional variance for each zone i.
Table 3.5 describes the results of the intervention analysis once the ARCH/GARCH
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Table 3.5: Intervention Analysis on Producer Share w/ GARCH eﬀects
Jimma Limu Harar Yirgachefe
Constant -0.726** -1.198*** -0.0312 0.451**
(0.334) (0.370) (0.206) (0.208)
t 0.00248*** 0.00340*** 0.00134*** 0.000497
(0.000632) (0.000702) (0.000384) (0.000388)
sharet−1 0.518*** 0.698*** 0.298*** 0.421***
(0.0819) (0.0779) (0.107) (0.0489)
ECX -0.108* -0.155** -0.0863** -0.181***
(0.0604) (0.0666) (0.0340) (0.0304)
α0 0.000691** 0.000691** 0.000647 0.00316***
(0.000341) (0.000341) (0.000637) (0.000941)
εt−1 0.215*** 0.317* 0.261 0.572***
(0.0664) (0.166) (0.170) (0.168)
εt−9 0.193
(0.122)
ht−1 0.775*** 0.265 0.702***
(0.0509) (0.349) (0.181)
N 138 138 138 138
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.6: Summary of the ECX's Eﬀect on Producer Share
Sidoma Jimma Limu Harar Yirgachefe
Impact eﬀect -0.125*** -0.108* -0.155** -0.0863** -0.181***
(0.0387) (0.0604) (0.0666) (0.0340) (0.0304)
Long run eﬀect -0.397*** -0.224* -0.513** -0.123** -0.312***
(0.0908) (0.131) (0.232) (0.0510) (0.0563)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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eﬀects are modeled. Table 3.6 reports the impact eﬀect of ECX and the long-
run eﬀect derived from the intervention analysis. The producer's share of the
export price appears to decline signiﬁcantly after ECX is introduced. The
largest short-run eﬀect occurs in Yirgachefe where the mean producer price
falls by 18 percentage points after ECX. In the long-run, the greatest de-
cline occurs in Limu with a 51 percentage point decrease in the mean. The
smallest decline occurs in Harar over the short-tun as well as the long-run
(8 and 12 percentage points, respectively). Such a widespread decline in the
producer's share suggests that there are additional layers in the new market-
ing system that appear to be detrimental to coﬀee producers. More evidence
on the transaction costs in the marketing system is needed to ascertain the
cause of the apparent occurrence.
3.4.2 Cointegration testing
In the absence of transaction costs data, price transmission measurements
have been employed by analysts to identify the strength of market linkages
(McNew and Fackler, 1997). Through analyzing the degree of price trans-
mission, one can begin to deduct the implications of transaction costs in a
market relationships. Improved price transmission in a vertical marketing
chain can plausibly be attributed to reductions in transaction costs, or vice
versa. While it is known that cointegration of prices does not indicate market
integration or that prices are transmitted eﬀectively, identifying cointegrat-
ing relationships is important for modeling the mean of a dynamic series.
Accurate models of the mean can be used to identify changes in the rate
of short-run and long-run price transmission given the institutional changes
engendered by ECX.
The Johansen (1995) method is a proven and well tested approach to iden-
tify cointegrated variables. However, this approach is susceptible to problems
with small sample performance and known to have low power for time series
of moderate length (Pedroni, 1999; Johansen, 2002). Given the splitting of
the sample in the research design, reliability problems may arise because of
low power to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration after ECX.3 There
are however viable alternatives for the ﬁnite sample problems.
3The period where ECX is operational spans 31 months in the data set (December 2008
- June 2011).
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Generally, Ethiopia is a price-taker in the international coﬀee market.
Coﬀee exports originating from Ethiopia constitute less than 3 percent of
world coﬀee exports, based on recent data from the International Coﬀee
Organization (2012). Ethiopian coﬀee exporters conduct transactions with
international buyers based on the prevailing international rate of Arabica cof-
fee, given the respective quality gradation. The FOB price paid to exporters
in Ethiopia is essentially the price of Arabica coﬀee on the international
market net of additional transportation costs and any quality premiums or
discounts attributed to Ethiopian coﬀee. Therefore, the export price data re-
ﬂect international coﬀee prices which are exogenous to local market dynamics.
This implies that the price paid to producers is endogenous to export prices.
Hence, it is reasonable to test for cointegration by modeling the error-
correction though a single equation autoregressive distributed lag (ADL)
speciﬁcation rather than the vector error-correction generated by the Jo-
hansen (1995) procedure. Speciﬁcally, consider the long-run log-linearized
equation determining producer prices as a function of export prices4:
PPt = α0 + τt+ β
ECXDtFPt + β
NOECX (1−Dt)FPt + ut (3.3)
where Dt is a dummy variable taking the value zero for all periods t prior
to December 2008 when ECX became operational in the coﬀee sector, and
a value of one afterwards. βECX is the long-run rate of price transmission
from the export price FPt to the producer price PPt under the ECX regime
and βNOECX is the long-run price transmission rate prior to ECX. ut is a
stochastic error term, α0 is a constant term and τ is a deterministic trend.
While the residuals from equation (3.3) can be used in the error-correction
format to test for cointegration, direct inference on βECX and βNOECX cannot
be made when estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The coeﬃcient
estimates from the long-run equation do not have asymptotic t-distributions
if the explanatory variable is correlated with the error term ut or if ut is
serially correlated (Enders, 2010b). However, the endogeneity problem and
serial correlation can be corrected by estimating a fully modiﬁed least squares
model developed by Phillips and Hansen (1990).
Following Enders (2010a), the fully modiﬁed least squares speciﬁcation is
4Log-linear functional forms are used to ease the interpretation of parameter estimates.
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characterized by
PPt = α0 + τt+ β
ECXDtFPt + β
NOECX (1−Dt)FPt (3.4)
+
P∑
p=1
δp∆PPt−p+
M∑
m=1
γ1m∆FPt+m +
P∑
p=0
γ2m∆FPt−p+ut
where endogeneity is controlled for by adding leads and lags of the dif-
ferenced explanatory variable ∆FPt and serial correlation is controlled for
by adding diﬀerenced lags of the dependent variable ∆PPt. In the event
that the the ut is still serially correlated, inference can be conducted on
βˆ =
(
βˆECX , βˆNOECX
)
by modifying the t-statistic t0 = (βˆ−β)/
√
var(ut) from
the standard hypothesis that βˆ = β. Speciﬁcally, the estimated residuals uˆt
are estimated as an AR(p) process
uˆt =
p∑
i=1
αiuˆt−i + εt (3.5)
where the estimated variance of εt is denoted by σ
2. The modiﬁed t-statistic
t∗is developed by constructing the value λ= σ/(1−
∑p
i=1 αi) and correcting the
standard t-statistic such that
t∗ = t0 ∗
√
var(ut)/λ. (3.6)
Using the correction in equation (3.6), standard t-tables can be used to con-
duct inference on βˆ.
As previously mentioned, Ethiopia is a price taker in the international
coﬀee market which reduces the likelihood of an endogeneity problem with
the FOB price arising in the data generating process for producer prices.
The price taker position of Ethiopia may further substantiate the ADL spec-
iﬁcation over the system error-correction model if indeed export prices are
weakly exogenous. Ideally, the structural ADL model can be speciﬁed
∆PPt = α (uˆt−1) +
K∑
i=1
γi∆PPt−i +
L∑
j=0
ψj∆FPt−j + vt (3.7)
where α is the adjustment parameter on the estimated residuals from the
cointegrating equation uˆt. The inclusion of the contemporaneous change in
export price ∆FPt is ideal from the perspective of identifying the short-run
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price transmission rate, however, caution must be taken when estimating
equation (3.7) by OLS. Dercon (1995) points out that if the explanatory
variable is not weakly exogenous there may be statistical dependence be-
tween the error term and the contemporaneous change in the explanatory
variable which will bias the OLS estimates. Therefore, it is necessary to ver-
ify the weak exogeneity assumption and conﬁrm the statistical independence
between the error term and the explanatory variable for OLS to yield valid
estimates of the structural ADL model.
Speciﬁcally, testing for independence requires estimating an auxiliary re-
gression of a reduced form error-correction model for the export price such
that only the weakly exogenous variables are included. Upon estimating this
auxiliary regression, the predicted values ∆FˆP t are included in a modiﬁed
version of equation (3.7) as in
∆PPt = α (uˆt−1) +
K∑
i=1
γi∆PPt−i +
L∑
j=0
ψj∆FˆP t−j + vt. (3.8)
In the speciﬁcation of equation (3.8), independence is maintained if the co-
eﬃcient estimate on the ∆FˆP t is not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
5 If
independence is not maintained, it is possible to add leads of ∆FPt into the
ADL equation to reduce the bias from the endogeneity.
3.4.2.1 Cointegration and error-correction results
The prices at each level are aggregated into an average price weighted by
each zone's market share of traded coﬀee. The market shares are based on
the volume of coﬀee moved through the Ethiopian coﬀee auction during the
ﬁrst coﬀee season that ECX operated (i.e. November 2008-June 2009).6 The
zones in this study constitute approximately 62 percent of the national coﬀee
market. The market shares are included as follows:
• Sidoma- 25.7 percent
• Jimma- 18.52 percent
5Also note, that the weak exogeneity assumption can be tested in the estimation of the
auxiliary equation by examining whether the export price adjusts to the long-run residuals.
6Although data on trade volume through the local market is not available prior to
ECX, the market share of each zone is believed to have been fairly consistent throughout
the sample period.
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Figure 3.3: Weighted Average of Coﬀee Prices (Real US Cents per lb.)
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• Limu- 3.8 percent
• Harar- 7.09 percent
• Yirgachefe- 7.3 percent
where each grade is accounted for. Figure 3.3 depicts the plots of the weighted
price series.
Dickey Fuller tests using a generalized least squares (GLS) transformation
are conducted to determine the stationarity properties of each series. This
form of the Dickey Fuller test uses a GLS estimation procedure to detrend
the data, which has been shown to have increased power over the standard
version of the test (Elliott et al., 1996). The results of the DF-GLS test are
presented in table 3.7 where each price series is found to be integrated of
order one. The non-stationarity of the producer price and the export price
suggest testing for a cointegrated relationship and examining the short run
dynamics with error correction modeling. Lag order selection testing indicate
a lag length of one for each pair of price variables in each region.
To identify an impact of the emergence of ECX on the long-run price
transmission, equation (3.4) is estimated assuming α0 = 0, a lag order of
four on the dependent and explanatory variable, and two leads on ∆FPt.
The errors from long-run equation are found to be serially correlated despite
the inclusion of lags of the dependent variable. Therefore, the corrected
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Table 3.7: Univariate Unit-Root Tests
DF-GLS Test
Statistic
(Level)
DF-GLS Test
Statistic (First
diﬀerence)
1%
Critical
Value
5%
Critical
Value
10%
Critical
Value
Producer Price -1.779 -6.858 -3.534 -2.983 -2.693
Export Price -1.465 -6.449 -3.534 -2.983 -2.693
Source: Author's calculation
Table 3.8: Long-run price transmission
Dependent variable Producer Price
Export price (t < ECX) .543*
(1.61)
Export price (t ≥ ECX) .450*
(1.33)
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
t-statistic is constructed to conduct inference on the long-run transmission
rates. Prior to ECX, 54.3 percent of the change in the export price was
passed through to the producer. However, after ECX the rate of transmis-
sion reduced to 45 percent. The corrected t-statistic indicates that both
parameter estimates are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. This
deteriorated price transmission in the long-run supports the previous ﬁnding
of a lower share of the export price yielded by producers in the post ECX
regime. The negative change in the long-run price transmission may arise
because of new costs of market participation with the introduction of ECX's
market design. However, it is unclear how this aﬀected the short-run price
transmission.
Given this result for the long-run case, it is interesting to test for any
changes in the short-run price transmission. To do this, I specify an error
correction model where the ECX dummy is interacted with the lags of both
the dependent and independent variables to form the modiﬁed version of
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equation (3.7):
∆PPt = α (uˆt−1) +
K∑
i=1
γECXi Dt∆PPt−i +
K∑
i=1
γNOECXi (1−Dt) ∆PPt−i
+
L∑
j=0
ψECXj Dt∆FPt−j +
L∑
j=0
ψNOECXj (1−Dt) ∆FPt−j + vt(3.9)
where Dt is deﬁned as taking the value zero for all periods t prior to De-
cember 2008, and a value of one afterwards. As previously mentioned, the
ADL speciﬁcation which includes the contemporaneous change in the export
price can only be considered valid if the export price is weakly exogenous
and there is no problem with endogeneity. Before proceeding with the ADL
speciﬁcation in (3.9) I verify this by testing for weak exogeneity of the ex-
port price and then employing the endogeneity test recommended by Dercon
(1995). I begin by specifying an ADL model with the export price as the
dependent variable and the producer price and the estimated residuals from
(3.4) as independent variables. Table 3.9 summarizes the estimation results.
The export price can be considered weakly exogenous if it does not adjust to
the long-run relation characterized in equation (3.4). The adjustment param-
eter on the lagged residuals from the long-run relation are not statistically
signiﬁcant. Therefore, the export price is weakly exogenous. To test the
endogeneity of the contemporaneous change in the export price, I save the
residuals from the ADL model of the export price and estimate the auxiliary
equation from (3.8). Table 3.10 reports the regression output. OLS will be
valid in the estimation of (3.9) only if the coeﬃcient on ∆FˆP t has no ex-
planatory power in the auxiliary regression. This appears to be the case as
the coeﬃcient on ∆FˆP t is not statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore, OLS can
be used to estimate equation (3.9).
Estimating the error-correction form of (3.9) can also conﬁrm whether the
export price and producer price maintain a cointegrated relationship. Since
it has been established that the export price does not adjust to the long-run
relation, cointegration can only be veriﬁed with short-run adjustments by the
producer price. Furthermore, any changes in the short-run price transmis-
sion can be identiﬁed by comparing the parameter estimates for ∆FPt before
and after ECX. Table 3.11 summarizes the regression results. The producer
price does indeed adjust to the long-run relation. Hence, cointegration is
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Table 3.9: Weak exogeneity test (export price)
∆FPt
Adjustment parameter -0.0344
(0.0491)
∆PPt−1 0.0411
(0.0618)
∆PPt−2 0.0352
(0.0598)
∆PPt−3 0.0564
(0.0604)
∆PPt−4 0.0365
(0.0572)
∆FPt−1 -0.0265
(0.0973)
∆FPt−2 -0.0145
(0.0956)
∆FPt−3 0.0847
(0.0958)
∆FPt−4 -0.0728
(0.0946)
Observations 131
R-squared 0.028
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.10: Endogeneity test on OLS
∆PPt
Adjustment parameter -0.354***
(0.121)
∆PPt−1 0.0678
(0.137)
∆PPt−2 0.351***
(0.132)
∆PPt−3 0.122
(0.181)
∆PPt−4 0.0777
(0.160)
∆FˆP t -0.702
(1.702)
∆FˆP t−1 -1.170
(1.557)
∆FˆP t−2 0.383
(1.096)
∆FˆP t−3 -1.618
(1.041)
∆FˆP t−4 -0.802
(1.052)
Observations 127
R-squared 0.197
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.11: Error-correction model
∆PPt
Adjustment parameter -0.251***
(0.0626)
∆FPNOECXt 0.560***
(0.192)
∆FPECXt -0.0161
(0.206)
Observations 131
R-squared 0.290
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
Estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
conﬁrmed. However, the short-run adjustment also appears to have deteri-
orated after ECX. Prior to ECX, the short-run price transmission from the
export price to the producer price is estimated at 56 percent. After the ECX
becomes active, the short-run price transmission is not statistically diﬀerent
form zero. This further corroborates the ﬁndings in the analysis of the pro-
ducer's share of the export price and supports the evidence of the long-run
deterioration of price transmission. The evidence from this component of the
analysis suggests that there is a potential breakdown in the upper tier of the
marketing system.
3.5 Conclusion
This study uses multiple criteria to evaluate the impact of the ECX on the
coﬀee sector in Ethiopia. One important metric of the ECX's success is it's
eﬀect on the share of the export price received by farmers. Coﬀee producers in
all zones included in the sample saw a decline in the share of the export price
after the establishment of the ECX. This is possibly due to the additional
layer that the ECX adds to coﬀee marketing which removes the direct link
many producers historically maintained to the export market. This rationale
may be made more transparent by the apparent deterioration in the link
between the export market and the local coﬀee market.
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With the new institutional presence in the coﬀee market, long-run inte-
gration between producers and exporters has also been negatively impacted
in the post ECX regime. Less price transmission from the export market
to the local coﬀee market after ECX implies that producers receive a pro-
portionally smaller price increase with rising export prices in the long-run
equilibrium. ECX is designed to use the coﬀee auction as an intermediary
between producers and exporters to facilitate the transparency of price dis-
covery. However, the introduction of the ECX appears to come at the cost
of weakened vertical market integration. Moreover, the short-run impact of
ECX appears to be even more severe than the long-run case. The rate of
price transmission from the export to domestic producers in the short-run
has completely diminished to zero in the post ECX regime. This result indi-
cates that after the introduction of ECX, high export prices in the short-run
are not immediately transmitted to producers. Therefore, despite the ICT
infrastructure provided by the ECX, the institution does not seem to be
beneﬁting coﬀee growers.
It is diﬃcult to explain the exact reasons for the breakdown in the coﬀee
market with the given data. However, it is plausible that with the advent
of the ECX exporters have gained in their relative market power after ECX
which stiﬂes the price discovery mechanism. Additionally, this result may also
reﬂect some information asymmetries between exporters and suppliers that
persist in the new regime, but are potentially exacerbated by the structure
of the new system. It is somewhat unclear if this reduction in relative price
is due to some market failures higher up in the marketing chain that have
not been identiﬁed or addressed, or if this is a function of some unrealized
and foregone beneﬁt of hedging. Currently, the ECX is operating as a cash-
based spot market and does not allow hedging through futures contracts.
It is interesting to consider the potential impact of making futures contracts
available to producers or suppliers that may allow more opportunities to con-
duct transactions at higher prices. Although, small coﬀee farmers may face
some practical constraints that preclude holding an inventory in anticipation
of better prices. Such constraints may force them to make transactions at in-
opportune times despite the potential gains of waiting for a futures contract
to mature.
Since the ECX was introduced as a nationwide policy, it is not possible
to identify a true counterfactual to test the impact of ECX on the Ethiopian
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coﬀee market. It is interesting to consider how the coﬀee sector would have
performed if the ECX had not been implemented as the only legitimate
channel for coﬀee trading. One potential direction for future research might
utilize a forecast of the conditional moments based on price data prior to
ECX, and measure the change in the conditional mean or conditional vari-
ance after ECX. However, the parametric structure of the model used in the
present study raises caution about the accuracy of forecasts. An improved
approach could make use of nonparametric or semiparametric econometric
methods to relax the restrictions imposed on the data generating process
by the parametric speciﬁcations. However, much higher frequency data is
needed to successfully make this extension.
Clearly, the ECX appears to be facing some important challenges during
its infancy in the coﬀee market. It is unclear as to whether the system is
ready to move into handling futures contracts. Currently, the ECX is also
channeling sesame seeds to the export market. However, questions remain
around the ability of ECX to attract large enough trade volumes in other
commodities such as grain. Nevertheless, ECX serves as a center for transac-
tion enforcement which has important value to market participants. However,
there is more to be done to insure that the net eﬀect of this institution is
truly beneﬁcial to local stakeholders.
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Concluding Remarks
Taking the results from each chapter together it becomes evident that insti-
tutions have a meaningful role in forwarding economic mobility. The case
of Brazil highlights the importance of land institutions for the poor. Land
institutions provide property rights which incentivize investments that lead
to higher incomes. Without such land institutions in place, land holders le-
gitimately staking claim to plots may suﬀer increased risk of asset loss and
fail to accumulate an asset wealth base. The positive value of property rights
is quantiﬁed in the case of the quilombola producers represented in the study
to encourage better management of resources dedicated to titling quilombo
lands in Brazil. Increased property rights are found to promote participation
in activities utilizing ﬁxed assets. The eﬀect on income is most meaningful
for producers earning income which exceeds the Brazilian minimum wage.
The implications of these results show that not all investments lead to in-
creased income. Moreover, there is a minimum wealth threshold that must
be surpassed in order for quilombola producers to beneﬁt from land title.
Therefore, institutions promoting income support should be coupled with
eﬀorts to improve land institutions in Brazil.
The second chapter identiﬁes the cost of poor infrastructure in commodity
marketing. Speciﬁcally, ths chapter measures market integration and mar-
ket eﬃciency with estimates of transaction costs in the wheat sector. High
transaction costs are found to be prevalent in areas where poor infrastructure
impacts spatial price relationships in Ethiopia. Furthermore, the challenges
facing infrastructure development in Ethiopia are found to have implica-
tions for social saftey nets. Eﬀorts to stabilize food markets in Ethiopia's
volatile pricing environment are hindered by poor infrastructure. Therefore,
the second chapter identiﬁes the important role that infrastructure plays in
marketing systems.
The ﬁnal chapter continues with an examination of Ethiopia commodity
markets. In particular, the impact of the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange
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on the Ethiopian coﬀee market is considered. Early signs indicate that pro-
ducers may not be better oﬀ with the new institution, despite the contract
enforcement, reduced search costs, and other beneﬁts aﬀorded by the ECX.
The ﬁndings of this study point to the need for improved infrastructure to
accompany the market information enhancements provided by the institu-
tion. It is important for the regional spot markets to be well functioning to
support the central commodity exchaneg, especially if futures contracts are
planned to be introduced. However, as found in the second chapter, Ethiopia
has underdeveloped infrastructure supporting regional spot markets. Thus,
it is not surprising that the provision of market information provided by ECX
is not suﬃcient to improve the coﬀee market, or the welfare of smallholder
coﬀee producers.
Comprehensively, the aforementioned chapters lead to greater under-
standing of the complimentary roles of institutions and infrastructure in sup-
porting functioning markets. The message is that there is no single solution
to the problems in developing economies. Rather, institutional reforms and
development targeting problem areas often need to be coupled with compli-
mentary institutions and interventions to realize the greatest impact.
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